India

“The Southern Challenge”: Contestatory Federalism in India*

Abstract

Does contestation by subnational units help in maintaining or even enhancing federal practices? This contribution examines recent developments in India, specifically the role of southern states in questioning the practice of federalism, in particular against increasing centralisation. It argues that the southern states play an important role in challenging actions by the federal government and thus also highlight the inequities of the centralised Indian federation and lack of institutionalised fora for intergovernmental relations and centre-state dialogues.

 

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Posted by Rekha Oleschak Pillai in Case Studies, 0 comments

Getting off the Shoulders of Giants: Cultural Federalism as a Decolonised Federal Concept from the Global South

Abstract

The discussion on the normative meaning of federalism for long have focused on power- sharing. On the one hand it has made federal discourse effective to bring outcomes which can provide better institutional mechanisms but on the other hand have not mapped the possibility of analysing and evaluating indigenous political systems which were available for discussion from post-colonial countries in the mid-twentieth century. The paper highlights the possibility of decolonising the discussion on federalism. It seeks to question the Eurocentrism and Western epistemological foundations of federalism as an idea and suggests with an example from India that there are many possible forms of federal arrangements which remain unacknowledged. The paper attempts to propose the idea of ‘cultural federalism’ as a conceptual category to comprehend the experience of federalism in post-colonial societies. The discussion highlights the uniqueness of tribal communities’ federal character. It concludes by arguing that cultural federalism can be the starting point to relocate the epistemological basis of federalism to the Global South and include post-colonial societies not merely as an object of study but as the basis of subjective considerations for developing theories in federal discourse.

 

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Posted by Vikas K. Choudhary in Theory, 0 comments

Concessionary Federalism as a Tactical Choice to Facilitate Constitutional Change—A Lesson from India’s Indirect Tax Reforms

Abstract

One of the key questions of research on federalism is to understand the conditions or causal mechanisms under which constitutional change—that reallocates powers between the centre and the states– becomes feasible in federal systems. However, the literature on federalism offers limited guidance on how to persuade subnational states to adopt amendments which seek to diminish their constitutionally assigned powers—especially their tax authority, which is a primordial feature of their institutional empowerment—without violating democratic decorum and federal principles. The case of indirect tax reforms in India assumes significance in this context. It adds important insights to the debate on how best to understand the circumstances under which the proposals to amend the constitutional division of powers enter the political agenda and the conditions under which they fail or are finally adopted.

 

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Posted by Chanchal Kumar Sharma in Case Studies, 0 comments

Covid-19 and Federalism in India

Abstract

The pandemic due to novel corona-virus in the Indian federation is controlled in its initial stage through centralized institutional arrangements with synergistic relationships of all state governments. Public servants and security forces are responsible to enforce lockdowns. These arrangements, in the exit plan, need to gradually give way to the decentralized responsibilities of local governments including panchayats and municipalities. The contagion can only be prevented by changing human attitudes and behaviours. Local governments and community, closest to the residents, are best placed to bring this change and inculcate physical distancing on sustainable basis. Hence, the role of local governments must be prominent, at least, in the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

 

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Posted by V N Alok in Policies, 0 comments

Language Policy in India: An Unstable Equilibrium?

Abstract

This article provides a short overview of language policy in India and situates this within a broader comparative perspective. It argues that India successfully managed to defuse linguistic conflict at the time of independence by combining elements of linguistic territoriality with the protection of linguistic minorities (personality) and the retention of English as an associate official link language. However, the article also shows how this ‘Indian’ middle way in language policy is currently being challenged by the rise of Hindi ‘majoritarian’ nationalism and the rise of regional (state) linguistic nationalism in response. 

 

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Posted by Wilfried Swenden in Diversity Management, Policies, 0 comments
The Union Model of Indian Federalism

The Union Model of Indian Federalism

Abstract

The Founding Fathers provided India with a Union Constitution and a model of federalism, which is now distinctively know as a ‘union model of federalism’. It distinctively harmonises otherwise opposite processes of (i) centralisation-decentralisation; (ii) autonomy-integration, and unionisation- regionalisation. The degree of federalism varies from Article to Article and from one context to another. One finds a consistency in the relative degrees of centralisation and decentralisation. Powers are distributed in a manner as to promote federal nationalism and regionalism, besides being an ethnically responsive federal polity. With the introduction of Goods and Services Taxes (GST) and the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) and growing salience of subject specific regulatory bodies, Indian federalism is gradually shifting towards a system of national governance, which I have termed ‘National federalism’. This contribution succinctly analyses these aspects of Indian federalism.

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Posted by Ajay Kumar Singh in Case Studies, 0 comments
Divide to rule? Federal Innovation (and its lack) in South Asia

Divide to rule? Federal Innovation (and its lack) in South Asia

Abstract

Ethnofederalism is too readily dismissed as a solution for accommodating territorially concentrated minorities within a state. This contribution demonstrates that although there are real concerns when these groups are not included within central decision making institutions or have their autonomy threatened by the centre, territorial autonomy for these groups increases rather than decreases their affinity with the central state. It is therefore a solution that should not be dismissed out of hand, although care needs to be taken when groups are intermixed and non-territorial autonomy may be necessary in addition.

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Posted by Katharine Adeney in Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments