Federalism and Conflict

Getting to a Power-Sharing Agreement: Insights for International Mediators on Adoptability from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq

   

Abstract

Power-sharing systems are complex, both in their design and daily operation. While the multifaceted nature of power-sharing is generally accepted by scholars and policymakers alike, understandings of the conditions under which these systems come into being, and how these conditions affect the implementation and the functioning of the power-sharing system, remain underdeveloped. Providing evidence from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, this contribution sheds new light on what it takes to get to a power-sharing agreement. We argue that power-sharing as a solution to violent conflict is only adopted when there is convergence on this approach within three distinct arenas: among domestic actors; among international actors; and between invested international actors and their domestic clients. Whereas Lebanon represents a case where alignment existed across all three arenas and Iraq showcases a lack of convergence at the domestic level, Syria provides an important case in which these three arenas do not converge – thereby explaining why no agreement on power-sharing has been reached so far.

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Posted by Soeren Keil; Allison McCulloch; Eduardo Aboultaif; Clara Pergola; Sahar Ammar in Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments

Empowering communities, elevating lives through better governance

Abstract

Empowering local governments is pivotal for fostering democratic principles, accountability, and sustainable service provision. By bolstering sub-national structures, nations like Somalia advanced in state-building efforts, promoted peacebuilding, addressed societal disparities, and continues to strengthen the social contract. In Somalia, the significance of local governance cannot be overstated. It plays a pivotal role in stabilizing fragile contexts, fostering peace, driving economic progress, enhancing administrative efficiency, and ensuring social inclusion. Local governments are instrumental in upholding peace, stability, and establishing state legitimacy.

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Posted by Nimo Mohamoud Jirdeh and Abdirahman Adan Mohamoud, 0 comments
Is Federalism Conducive to Ethnic Outbidding?

Is Federalism Conducive to Ethnic Outbidding?

Abstract

‘Ethnic outbidding’ captures a type of electoral competition in which parties that champion the interests of ethnic groups contest each other by adopting ever more radical positions on ethnic issues. Yet, despite the fact that many of the world’s plural societies have both, significant ethnic parties and federal institutions, we do not yet know how federalism affects the likelihood of ethnic outbidding. This contribution develops some theoretical expectations about the relationship between federalism and ethnic outbidding, and discusses what kind of evidence we would need in order to test whether they hold true.

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Posted by Christina Isabel Zuber in Federalism and Conflict, Theory, 0 comments

Northern Ireland: Power-Sharing in Crisis

Abstract

In spite of numerous suspensions in its initial years, nationalist and unionist parties shared power for an uninterrupted 10 years from 2007-17. At the time of writing, however, Northern Ireland finds itself in a seemingly intractable political crisis, produced by both internal and external factors, and the future of power-sharing hangs in the balance. The impasse underlines the need for broad inclusion in power-sharing arrangements, beyond the core ethno-national parties. It further speaks to the importance of continued constructive engagement from external actors, who were central to the conflict and remain central to its resolution.

 

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Posted by Cera Murtagh in Case Studies, Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments

Minorities in Consociational Power-Sharing

Abstract

Consociational power-sharing requires representation of politically relevant groups’ in halls of government to stop violence and place checks on the rule by a single group. But regardless of the admirable aspiration for inclusive government and politics, who is to be represented and whose participation counts is based exclusively on all-around identities (such as ethnicity, denomination), leaving the interests of non-dominant groups’ open for co-optation into ethnic blocs of those guaranteed the right to veto political dynamics. Mandated cooperation between elites of only selected groups challenges equitable representation of all segments of the electorate in equal measure to undermining consociations’ ability to respond to concerns of the general public. More often than not, non-dominant, minority groups in consociations are accommodated only pro forma as the elites of dominant groups are expected to cooperate regardless of the input from elites of minorities, who at will can be co-opted by the dominant groups to attain their own particular ends. The representation of the interests of members of the non-dominant, minority, and ‘other’ groups thus follows from, rather than accompanies, the consolidation of dominant groups’ political identities in the otherwise shared power-sharing polity.

 

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Posted by Timofey Agarin, 0 comments
Guaranteeing Federalism in Post-Conflict Societies

Guaranteeing Federalism in Post-Conflict Societies

Abstract

Federalism is at the heart of many current and proposed conflict resolution settlements. It provides territorially concentrated groups, usually those that are minorities within the wider state, with autonomy over a range of matters. Yet such arrangements are often unhappy compromises, with identity groups pursuing higher levels of autonomy, up to and including secession or unification with a neighbouring kin-state, and central government seeking to limit the level of autonomy to retain power and protect against state break-up. The compromise nature of such measures and the post-conflict context in which they operate makes them inherently unstable. This paper assesses the potential of guarantee mechanisms to overcome the innate instability of federlaism as a conflict resolution mechanism by examining two cases, Bosnia, and Iraq, where federalism was a key element of a political agreement aimed at ameliorating intra-state group based conflict.

 

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Posted by Dawn Walsh in Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments
Divide to rule? Federal Innovation (and its lack) in South Asia

Divide to rule? Federal Innovation (and its lack) in South Asia

Abstract

Ethnofederalism is too readily dismissed as a solution for accommodating territorially concentrated minorities within a state. This contribution demonstrates that although there are real concerns when these groups are not included within central decision making institutions or have their autonomy threatened by the centre, territorial autonomy for these groups increases rather than decreases their affinity with the central state. It is therefore a solution that should not be dismissed out of hand, although care needs to be taken when groups are intermixed and non-territorial autonomy may be necessary in addition.

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Posted by Katharine Adeney in Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments
Federalism: A Tool for Conflict Resolution?

Federalism: A Tool for Conflict Resolution?

Abstract

Federalism has become increasingly used as a tool of conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. This contribution discusses the rationale in using federalism as a tool of peace-building, conflict resolution and democratisation in deeply divided, ethnically heterogeneous and post-conflict societies. In doing so, it is highlighted how federalism can serve as an acceptable and viable solution for different ethnic groups because of its emphasis on autonomy and territorial integrity. The contribution also demonstrates that federalism is not able to solve all problems in ethnically heterogeneous societies and that further research is needed in order to understand the conditions in which federalism can be used to end conflict and bring peace and democracy to divided countries.

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Posted by Paul Anderson and Soeren Keil in Federalism and Conflict, 0 comments