Theory

Oct

2024

Postcolonial Federalism and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Abstract

For decades, debate has revolved around whether the Islamic Republic of Pakistan qualifies as a federation. This uncertainty originates from the lack of democratic credentials within Pakistan’s federal system and its multilevel operations. Often ignored is Pakistan’s colonial history and the legacies of colonial rule that have aided and abetted this status quo. Postcolonial Federalism advocates a relationship between the de jure and de facto legacies of colonial rule and Pakistan’s current federal dynamics. It emphasises the importance of colonial socio-political engineering and the inheritance of institutions after independence in 1947. To understand the social reality of federations such as Pakistan, it is essential to detach from the Western frameworks and objectives of federalism as we know them.

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Feb

2023

Getting off the Shoulders of Giants: Cultural Federalism as a Decolonised Federal Concept from the Global South

Abstract

The discussion on the normative meaning of federalism for long have focused on power- sharing. On the one hand it has made federal discourse effective to bring outcomes which can provide better institutional mechanisms but on the other hand have not mapped the possibility of analysing and evaluating indigenous political systems which were available for discussion from post-colonial countries in the mid-twentieth century. The paper highlights the possibility of decolonising the discussion on federalism. It seeks to question the Eurocentrism and Western epistemological foundations of federalism as an idea and suggests with an example from India that there are many possible forms of federal arrangements which remain unacknowledged. The paper attempts to propose the idea of ‘cultural federalism’ as a conceptual category to comprehend the experience of federalism in post-colonial societies. The discussion highlights the uniqueness of tribal communities’ federal character. It concludes by arguing that cultural federalism can be the starting point to relocate the epistemological basis of federalism to the Global South and include post-colonial societies not merely as an object of study but as the basis of subjective considerations for developing theories in federal discourse.

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Dec

2022

Does Federalism Foster Happiness? Reviewing Political Decentralization and Citizens’ Happiness

Abstract

Federalism settles decision-making power to state levels close to its citizens. This decentralization of power should enable political output to be as responsive and corresponding as possible to the diverse demands and needs of the society – resulting in politically happy citizens. As such, federalism and decentralization may represent a polity of better governance. However, federalism can also have negative effects, such as, high costs of consent, more corruption or even less accountability since citizens do not have not enough resources to monitor all governmental levels. Both, the pro- nor the contra-argumentation in federal theory provide good reasons to be decisive. Yet, empirics show mainly a positive relationship between federalism/decentralization and happiness.

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Dec

2021

Shades of Federal Theory

Abstract

The conceptual history of federalism only begins in the 17^th century as a response to Bodin’s doctrine of absolute and indivisible sovereignty. Modern federalism has therefore typically been understood as a variation of the state, most importantly in the form of the federal state. Non-statist federal concepts have been ignored or neglected. Against the pessimistic assumption that a universal federal principle cannot be found, I suggest that it is at least possible to identify a coherent set of normative principles without which federalism would not make sense. These principles are membership equality, subsidiarity, social solidarity, and federal comity.

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Sep

2021

Why we should stop cherry-picking in the analysis of consociational institutions

Abstract

The research on consociationalism and conflict needs to take into account the interplay between consociational institutions such as self-rule, power sharing, parliamentarism, and proportional representation. We present a configurational risk analysis of 556 subnational cases in 21 fractionalized post-war anocracies, which aims at identifying in which consociational configurations self-rule is associated with a reduction or rather increase of violent conflict risk. In our analysis, the full consociational package is indeed associated with a conflict risk reduction. However, consociationalism is not the only game in town, with majoritarianism being on par when it comes to peace promotion. In contrast, mixing institutions from both “worlds” is actually associated with an increase of conflict risk. Divided societies are therefore well advised to adopt consistent approaches of institutional engineering.

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Jun

2021

Is Federalism Conducive to Ethnic Outbidding?

Abstract

‘Ethnic outbidding’ captures a type of electoral competition in which parties that champion the interests of ethnic groups contest each other by adopting ever more radical positions on ethnic issues. Yet, despite the fact that many of the world’s plural societies have both, significant ethnic parties and federal institutions, we do not yet know how federalism affects the likelihood of ethnic outbidding. This contribution develops some theoretical expectations about the relationship between federalism and ethnic outbidding, and discusses what kind of evidence we would need in order to test whether they hold true.

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Mar

2021

Where does financial responsibility lie? Emerging paradigms from a comparison between Germany and Spain

Abstract

Financial responsibility traces the academic and political debate of any decentralising process. This is even more so in the European context, in which taxes – exclusively set and regulated by the subnational legislator – play a marginal role in subnational financing, though in theory they are the most genuine instrument for making SNGs pay for their decisions. Against this framework, this contribution delves into a selection of case studies (i.e., Germany and Spain) testing the principle of financial responsibility from a comparative and legal perspective. The basic assumption is that the way in which the vertical fiscal gap is addressed influences the degree of financial autonomy (and hence responsibility) of subnational entities. As such, the major issue at stake is the revenue structure of the subnational level of government, with regard to the legal tools and procedures devoted to revenue-sharing, as these elements play a key-role in defining the extent to which SNGs are made financially and politically responsible for their financing.

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Jan

2021

On the Relationship between Federalism, Decentralization, and Statehood

Abstract

This brief study looks empirically at the relationship between federalism, decentralization, and statehood. This relationship is often studied by case studies, rather than looking at the subject from a broader empirical perspective. The analysis is based on a sample of 49 countries from different world regions, using data from the Fragile States Index (FSI) and the Regional Authority Index (RAI). The findings show that the degree of statehood is not related to a federal structure of a state, but related to the degree of decentralization.

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Dec

2020

The Veil, the Scales and the Sword: Moral and Legal Argument on Secession

Abstract

To build legitimate and successful secession claims and strategies, both moral and legal arguments are important. As regards moral reasoning, a nuanced primary theory of secession with remedial features is presented. With respect to the legal field, the remedial logic of general international law is distinguished from that of constitutional law. Constitutionalizing a qualified primary right to secede is then defended with the aim of fostering multinational accommodation and, ultimately, consensual secession. Although the legal regulation of secession is often partial and defective, legality must be taken seriously in liberal-democratic settings.

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Oct

2020

Centripetal Federalism

Abstract

Centripetalism is often perceived as a type of a political system for a multi-segmental, especially multi-ethnic, country in order to create among the members of the political elite of integrative and moderate political behavior cross-cutting segmental divisions which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in this manner, reduce their significance. One of the central institutions of centripetalism is decentralization leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental regions, thus inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate. Although both Nigeria and Indonesia have similar centripetal territorial structures, only Nigeria is a federation. This paper focuses on Nigerian centripetal federalism and its link to the so-called federal character principle that is mostly consociational in substance.

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