Abstract
Power-sharing systems are complex, both in their design and daily operation. While the multifaceted nature of power-sharing is generally accepted by scholars and policymakers alike, understandings of the conditions under which these systems come into being, and how these conditions affect the implementation and the functioning of the power-sharing system, remain underdeveloped. Providing evidence from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, this contribution sheds new light on what it takes to get to a power-sharing agreement. We argue that power-sharing as a solution to violent conflict is only adopted when there is convergence on this approach within three distinct arenas: among domestic actors; among international actors; and between invested international actors and their domestic clients. Whereas Lebanon represents a case where alignment existed across all three arenas and Iraq showcases a lack of convergence at the domestic level, Syria provides an important case in which these three arenas do not converge – thereby explaining why no agreement on power-sharing has been reached so far.
