Who Governs Education? Multi-level Governance and the Politics of Coordination in India and Germany

Abstract

This article conducts a comparative case study of Germany and India to examine how education is governed within their federal systems. Based on the multi-level governance theory, it examines the role of institutional design in determining the relative autonomy of subnational and national coordination. Germany is an example of a decentralised country in which coordination is achieved through negotiated and consensus-based mechanisms and fiscal incentives. India, in turn, presents a path of concurrency, driven by the growth of regulations and the setting of standards. The article demonstrates that federalism in education operates through different coordination channels and depicts that the forces of globalisation reform these processes, creating a persistent flux between local autonomy and federal authority, thereby adding a new dimension to the concept of educational federalism.

Introduction

Education is now a focal point for many federal governments, where constitutional design, economic transformation, and global competitiveness intersect. Whereas federal systems officially redistribute power among the levels of government, current education policy is becoming increasingly coordinated, standardised, and responsive to global benchmarking regimes. This raises a structural question about the balance between national coherence and subnational autonomy.

This tension is discussed in this article through a comparative study of Germany and India, two federal systems with differing institutional frameworks. Germany is an example of a constitutionally entrenched system of decentralisation based on Kulturhoheit, in which Länder have primary authority but coordinate through negotiated institutional structures. India, in turn, is indicative of a formally concurrent system that has been developed under federal control by the proliferation of regulations, fiscal mechanisms, and judicial interpretation.

Theoretically, the article situates itself within the literature on multi-level governance (MLG) and comparative federalism. It claims that Germany is more of a Type I (general-purpose, territorially based jurisdictions) with some Type II features (task-specific, functionally differentiated governance). It draws on the distinction between Type I and Type II systems in Hooghe and Marks (2003), building on the characteristics of Germany as a Type I system (coordinated interdependence) and India as a Type II system (growth of federal regulation). Simultaneously, the discussion addresses arguments about cooperative and hierarchical federalism, as well as regulatory and fiscal federalism, and illustrates how coordination mechanisms shape policy outcomes.

The article addresses three questions, namely, how institutional structures influence autonomy and coordination; what contributes to convergence; and how global pressures transform federal arrangements. It claims that educational federalism is better understood as a negotiated multi-level system of governance, where coordination is generated either by consensus-based interaction (Germany) or by hierarchical standardisation supported by legal and fiscal power (India).

 

Institutional Structures and the Distribution of Authority 

The institutional structure of educational federalism has been a basic determinant of the distribution and coordination of authority among levels of government. The principle of Kulturhoheit is institutionalised in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of Germany, which places education within the legislative competence of the Länder in Articles 30 and 70 (Mäding, 1989). This is a typical Type I multi-level system of governance, in which power is territorially delimited and constitutionally safeguarded. The federal government does not have direct power over education, but it has been indirectly influential in the past. Before the 2006 Federalism Reform I, the Bund had employed framework legislation (Article 75), shared competences in vocational training and research and shared tasks in policy formation. The reform was a major realignment, as it eliminated framework legislation, created limited concurrent competences in higher education, and granted Länder the right of deviation (Materielles Abweichungsrecht).Even though joint responsibilities under Articles 91a and 91b were limited, coordination is still maintained through consensus-based mechanisms that require intergovernmental agreement (Scheller, 2018).This is characteristic of a system of cooperative federalism in which authority is decentralised, but policy coherence is not established on a hierarchical basis.

India’s institutional path is very different.Education was included in the Concurrent List under the 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976), thereby formally permitting shared legislative power.Nevertheless, the Union’s authority under Entry 66 to fix standards has facilitated a progressive concentration of power.This has led to what can be conceptualised as regulatory federalism, where the central institutions wield power not by administration but by rule-making, accreditation and standard-setting.

The institutional designs shape autonomy differently. Germany features “administrative federalism,” characterised by high interdependence, in which the Bund provides framework legislation and the Länder handle implementation (Mäding, 1989). Recent reforms, such as Federalism Reform I (2006), sought to decouple these powers, yet the system remains a “cooperative unitarization” in which states voluntarily harmonise to maintain competitiveness (Scheller, 2018). India’s design is increasingly “quasi-federal”, driven by statutory regulators like the University Grants Commission (UGC), the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE), which set national standards for curricula and accreditation. These different patterns persist due to historical legacies. Germany’s decentralisation was a post-WWII reaction against the centralised Nazi regime. India’s quasi-unitary drift stems from a post-independence focus on national integration and uniformity of standards. While Germany moves toward unitarization in response to the “PISA shock” and global competitiveness, India remains a ‘matrix’ system that seeks to balance national coherence with regional diversity.

In contrast to the territorially bound power structure of Germany, India’s is increasingly characterised by functional differentiation and overlapping competencies, which are more indicative of Type II multi-level governance.

Germany has horizontal coordination and administrative decentralisation at the executive level.The Länder retain control over curriculum, teacher recruitment, and institutional governance and the municipalities control infrastructure.The federal government uses fiscal tools and agenda-setting as key sources of influence, drawing on the principles of fiscal federalism, in which policy is organised by funding mechanisms rather than by formal power.

This is coordinated within institutionalised forums: the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (KMK), a horizontal policy coordination body; the Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK), for research funding coordination; and the Federal Education Ministry (Ministry of Education and Research – Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF), which serves as an interface between national and international policy.The network of governance is dense, with non-state actors such as the German Research Foundation (DFG), the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat, WR), the German Rectors’ Conference (HRK), and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) playing a role. This structure brings out what can be termed co-operative competition, whereby Länder can be autonomous but work within a coordinated system.

On the other hand, vertical asymmetry and hierarchical coordination are evident in India’s executive educational federalism. Although implementation is the responsibility of the States, central influence is entrenched through regulatory institutions and administrative mechanisms. Governors, who are also Chancellors of State universities, are another level of control in State systems (Sarkaria Commission, 1988; NCRWC, 2002). Curricula and institutional practices are influenced by national bodies such as the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS), and the Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti (NVS), whereas standards and access are regulated by regulatory agencies and national entrance examinations such as the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET), the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE), and the Common University Entrance Test (CUET) (Indian Express, 2021; Indian Express, 2022; Economic Times, 2025).

Such patterns are also supported by judicial dynamics. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court serves as a watchdog for the federal balance, consistently safeguarding the autonomy of the Länder and checking federal encroachment. Its jurisprudence is decentralising in orientation and has institutional means, such as competence disputes and Bundesrat vetoes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In India, the Supreme Court has expanded the role of the Union by giving a broad interpretation to Entry 66, which serves as an example of the judiciary’s role in re-scaling federal power. The major decisions have enhanced control over standards and admissions, limiting the states’ autonomy.

 

Coordination, Standardisation and Policy Mechanisms 

The difference between Germany and India is most pronounced in the systems where the coordination and standardisation are realised. Soft governance mechanisms such as benchmarking, peer review and negotiated agreements are the key ways of coordination in Germany. The KMK is at the centre of ensuring the harmonisation of curricula and the equivalence of qualifications, while maintaining the autonomy of Länder.

After the PISA shock of the early 2000s, Germany embraced the outcome-based forms of governance that focus on performance measurement and comparability. Such developments have been in line with broader trends of governing by numbers, in which policy convergence is achieved through data, indicators, and reciprocal checks and balances. Notably, these processes do not alter the constitutional distribution of power, illustrating how coordination can be achieved in a decentralised structure.

The federal power is exercised through fiscal tools such as the Excellence Initiative and Higher Education Pacts, which provide incentives for Länder compliance (Busemeyer, 2014).This is indicative of a fiscal steering model in which funding is an important coordinating tool. Conceptually, Germany is an example of a system of soft coordination, cooperative federalism, where legitimacy is upheld by consensus and mutual accommodation. Instead, India has to use hierarchical and regulatory means to attain standardisation. Federal authority is further strengthened by policies such as the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, which entails curricular structures and regulatory reorganisation (Saxena, 2023).

Fiscal policies are important as well. Schemes such as Samagra Shiksha, which are centrally sponsored, provide conditional transfers to harmonise State policies with national priorities. Also, the Fiscal Responsibility Budget Management Act of 2003 alters the state’s capacity to fund its institutions (GOI, 2003). In contrast to the negotiated fiscal coordination in Germany, fiscal mechanisms in India are more controlled, thereby strengthening vertical power. This creates a hybrid system which is centralised in policy design and decentralised in policy implementation, with the States retaining administrative functions but acting within a centrally defined framework. This model may be effective at providing uniform standards, but it sometimes challenges the flexibility and local responsiveness.

 

Global Transformations and the Reconfiguration of Federalism 

Globalisation has fundamentally reshaped educational federalism in Germany and India by introducing “transnational soft governance” and competitiveness agendas that challenge traditional subnational autonomy. In both nations, international benchmarks and assessments have acted as catalysts for reform, though they are “digested” differently based on preexisting institutional structures.

Germany is a country that has embraced national educational standards, comparative assessment, and monitoring systems due to international benchmarking, particularly through the OECD’s PISA. These tools have improved the coordination of the KMK, making it a convergence point for policies. Remarkably, this has been achieved without a substantive constitutional amendment, illustrating how benchmarking can affect the functional centralisation of a decentralised system.

External shocks also drive coordination: the integration of approximately 1.1 million refugees in 2015-2016 required swift intergovernmental responses in the education sector, thereby increasing Bund-Länder debates over funding and implementation (OECD, 2017). Combined, these shifts indicate that global pressures operate through benchmarking, funding, and crisis response, and further cement coordination without centralisation as such.

In Germany, the “PISA shock” of 2001 revealed disappointing performance in international comparisons—triggered a shift toward “cooperative unitarization”. The federal government and the Länder (states) responded by implementing national standards and the Bologna Process, which aimed to harmonise degrees across Europe (Dobbins and Knill, 2017). This global pressure compelled the Länder to engage in “isomorphic emulation” of successful foreign models, leading to initiatives like junior professorships and (temporary) tuition fees to enhance international competitiveness. While the states retain  Kulturhoheit, global benchmarks such as the OECD’s Education at a Glance have prompted a degree of voluntary harmonisation through the KMK to ensure national mobility and quality.

In India, globalisation has intensified the Union’s response to demands by promoting Foreign Higher Education Institutions (FHEIs) and creating special enclaves such as GIFT City (GOI, 2023). This “systemic pull” from the Centre aims to create a uniform national brand to attract global talent, but it often curtails the policy space of States, which bear the primary financial burden of implementation. Such mechanisms bring global priorities into regulatory and fiscal frameworks, which are more likely to restrain state-level differentiation (Rao & Singh, 2005).

Global challenges and external shocks have altered intergovernmental coordination by necessitating new “synaptic junctions” for dialogue. In Germany, this led to the replacement of the Bund-Länder Commission (BLK) with the GWK to manage supraregional research funding in a more competitive environment. In India, the response has been more hierarchical, with the Centre utilising executive federalism to balance national standards with regional diversity.

 

Conclusion: Educational Federalism beyond Constitutional Design

Germany and India demonstrate that educational federalism does not rely solely on the constitutional design, but also on the mechanisms of the coordination process. Germany is an example of cooperative, consensus-based federalism, where coordination occurs through negotiation, fiscal incentives, and soft governance. However, the Indian case depicts hierarchical, regulatory federalism, in which federal power is exercised legally, institutionally, and fiscally. Effective educational federalism is defined not only by constitutional text but by the dynamic interplay of administrative, judicial, and fiscal processes. While constitutions provide the legal scaffolding, “effective” governance emerges from “executive federalism” and the ability of intergovernmental bodies to negotiate standards.

Soft coordination and fiscal incentives can be used to achieve convergence and ensure legitimacy, although hierarchical implementation can lead to uniform national policy implementation.

In a broader context, it is important to understand how multi-level educational governance functions by showing how federal systems can modify their institutional paths in response to global demands. With education becoming part of economic and social policy, federal systems will continue to negotiate the autonomy-versus-coordination equilibrium, and educational federalism will remain a dynamic and vibrant field of governance.

 

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Further Reading

Saxena, R. (2023) ‘Federalising education: New Education Policy 2020 and the way ahead’, in Akhtar, N. (ed.) Revolutionising education: navigating the NEP 2020 era. New Delhi: VL Media Solutions.

Welsh, H.A. (2009) ‘Higher education reform in Germany: advocacy and discourse’, German Politics and Society, 27(1), pp. 67–88.