America

American State Constitutions as Ordinary Law

Abstract

Americans revere the United States Constitution and the Founders who created it, so they rarely amend the Constitution, and they rely on the United States Supreme Court to elaborate its meaning. But they have a very different relationship to their state constitutions. They regularly amend their state constitutions or replace them altogether, and they have no compunction about jettisoning what the constitutions’ founders created.  When they disagree with how a state court interprets the state constitution, they adopt amendments to overrule the judges or even vote them out of office. This dual constitutionalism encourages a distinctive political practice. Americans treat the U.S. Constitution as a repository of political principles, but they view their state constitutions as a species of ordinary law and use them rather than revere them, including in them provisions that could as easily be put in statutes. This facilitates popular control over government. The result is a system of dual constitutionalism that combines stability at the national level with dynamism at the state level, statements of fundamental principle at the national level with the vigor of popular input at the state level.

 

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Posted by Alan Tarr in Case Studies, 0 comments

Voting, Elections and US Federalism: The Federal Government Perspective

Abstract

This article examines the U.S. Constitution’s treatment of voting and elections and the use that the federal government has made of the powers granted to it by the Constitution.  Because the thirteen states that formed the nation differed in the qualifications they imposed for voting, the Constitution originally avoided setting national qualifications, authorizing persons to vote in federal elections if they could vote for the lower house of their state legislature. Constitutional amendments have established a federal floor on voting qualifications, forbidding discrimination based on race, gender, age, and ability to pay a poll tax. States have largely regulated both their own and federal elections, but the Constitution grants the federal government concurrent authority in this area, and the constitutional amendments have granted it authority to enact “appropriate legislation” to enforce their prohibitions of discrimination.  Congress relied on that authority to adopt the Voting Rights Act of 1965, giving the federal government unprecedented power to supervise state elections and voting regulations.  This power has been circumscribed by Supreme Court rulings in recent years, leading Democrats in Congress to introduce bills to restore that power. Congress has also legislated to facilitate voting more generally, though Republicans have sought instead to restrict voting, claiming that this will combat election fraud. A major piece of legislation, the For the People Act, is currently before Congress, designed to nationalize election regulations and facilitate voting, but it faces strong Republican opposition, and its fate is uncertain.

 

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Posted by Alan Tarr in Case Studies, 0 comments

Covid-19, the USA and the Generation of Constitutional Conflict

Abstract

The United States has responded ineffectively to the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about the capacity of contemporary American federalism to deal with crises.  This article examines the scope of power granted to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution and the legislative power available to states under state constitutions, concluding that these powers are adequate to deal with the pandemic and other emergencies.  It then considers whether having multiple governments confronting the crisis has precluded a coordinated response.  Although scholars have highlighted cooperative federalism in the United States, cooperation is not automatic, and in recent years American political parties have become more ideologically cohesive and more polarized. Federalism has multiplied the opportunities for these parties to advance their objectives or to frustrate those of their adversaries in the overlapping domains in which both states and the federal government operate. The result has been uncooperative federalism.

 

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Posted by Alan Tarr in Policies, 0 comments