Theory

Joint-decision Making: An Alternative to Centralisation / Decentralisation

Joint-decision Making: An Alternative to Centralisation / Decentralisation

Abstract

The text presents the concept of joint-decision making as an idea and alternative to the already established concepts of centralisation and decentralisation in federal studies. Whereas the notions of centralisation and decentralisation seem to be well established in federal studies, the idea of joint-decision making seems to count only as a German speciality or a German feature of federal studies. This paper further explores this idea and concept, drawing upon the German case as well as suggesting it is worth expanding beyond it.

Introduction

It is an open question, if a clear and long-lasting location of competences (or powers in North-American parlance) on the central or decentral territorial level of decision making is needed in any political system. In other words, from time to time an adjustment of the location of competences may be required in order to preserve a stable democratic political system. At the same time, competences also need to be fixed for preserving a stable political system. This paradoxical situation of change and stability exists for all political systems, no matter if competences are fixed in constitutions or not. This also means that political system without written constitutions, like the United Kingdom and Israel, face similar challenges particularly when compared to federal systems. Therefore, the question if decisions about change and stability in politics are taken on a territorially defined central or decentral level is at the heart of all political systems (Benz et al. 2016b). Even if a permanent solution should be found as to where to locate competences (on a central or decentral political level), the question remains: What competences should be placed on a central or decentral territorial level? At this point arguments vary. There are a number of advantages and disadvantages that occur when locating competences on a (de)central territorially defined level.

Another possibility beyond centralisation and decentralisation of competences exists. At least in the German and European Union (EU) realm the idea of joint-decision making is apparent in many instances. A growing number of other political systems have also recently begun to discover the idea of joint-decision making. The additional concept of joint-decision making stands beside the concepts of centralisation and decentralisation. Hence (de)centralisation and joint-decision making are by no means mutually exclusive or an antinomy, but interrelated and can co-exist beside each other. The suggestion of establishing a political system of joint-decision making seems to be a way out of the zero-sum game between (de)centralisation.

In classical texts about joint-decision making (Scharpf et al. 1976), the concept is often presented as an alternative to the issue of the centralisation and decentralisation of competences. Indeed, joint-decision making contradicts the general idea of transparency with the clear location of competences because all territorial levels are involved in the financing and execution of policies. Whereas in the classical example of the work about joint-decision making the financing was or is the task of the central (upper) territorial level, the execution of policies or policy making was or is the task of the decentral (lower) territorial level. This situation, for instance, is the case in German federalism as well as the EU. Indeed, joint-decision making combines a certain amount of autonomy and community for the solution of different problems. In the German context, Fritz Scharpf and colleagues argued that joint-decision making engenders better efficiency in dealing with problems about common goods, joint products and external effects (costs). Whereas finding solutions to those problems requires the cooperation of federal and federated entities, federal and federated entities also need to preserve their autonomy in other contexts. The question, therefore, remains: What mix is needed to ensure they are effective and legitimate? All political systems thus need to determine on their own in what contexts autonomous solutions and in what contexts common solutions are needed or wanted for achieving efficient and legitimate solutions for problems at stake. Throughout time, the mix of autonomy and community needs to balanced anew

Terminological Clarification

The core definition of joint-decision making (Politikverflechtung) can be found in German language in publications many years ago from Fritz Scharpf et al. in 1976:

“…bei dem zwar einerseits die Entscheidungsautonomie der dezentralen Entscheidungseinheiten eingeschränkt wird, bei dem jedoch andererseits die umfassenden Entscheidungseinheiten (Bund, Länder, Europäische Gemeinschaft) nicht gesamte Aufgabenkomplexe an sich zogen,…” (Scharpf et al. 1976: 29)

In a corresponding translation, this means that embracing decision units (like the federal government in Germany, Länder or the European Community / Union) did not attract every embracing competence. The autonomy of decentral political units was restricted to those competences the central and decentral level could agree on. This therefore means that there are no exit strategies or opting out solutions in a joint-decision making system. For none of the governments, be it a central government, decentral governments or any other governmental actor would be able to pursue its own policies.

Starting from this definition the concept of joint-decision making was adjusted into horizontal, vertical or compound decision-making structures (Benz et al 1992). The compound structures were the initial idea for developing the concept of joint-decision making and the horizontal and vertical structures of decision making were added later to the initial concept.

Moreover, the concept of the joint-decision trap gained prominence in public and academic discourse with the definition that a factual joint-decision trap has an elaborated meaning that “systematically (…) inefficient and inadequate problem-solving” takes place. At the same time, the federal system is unable to “change the institutional conditions of its decision-making logic” (Scharpf, 1988: 271). Hence the absence of the joint-decision trap. This is because the political system is unitary (and not federal), but does not mean that political performance is per se better. The quality of political output does not directly relate to the fact that a system of joint-decision making works or does not work (for the case of the joint-decision trap).

Joint-Decision Making and Federal Studies

The concept of joint-decision making is closely related to federal studies because it relates to different levels of decision- and policy-making. Furthermore, testable hypotheses can be derived from the general concept of joint-decision making. The concept was latter made more specific by Fritz Scharpf himself, but also by other scholars, with a particular focus on why joint-decision making is prone to being unable to produce suitable solutions for political problems ending in the joint-decision trap (Politikverflechtungs-Falle) (Scharpf 1988). In reality, there indeed exists a joint-decision trap, but Fritz Scharpf himself laid down that this is only one possibility among several possibilities. Political actors circumvent the joint-decision trap regularly, and are thus rarely caught in the joint decision trap.

Sharpening Focus

Discussions about joint-decision making (Politikverflechtung) started in 1976 with the book of Fritz Scharpf, Bernd Reissert and Fritz Schnabel. Later the concept was narrowed down to the joint decision trap (Scharpf 1988). But the concept was also broadened and a horizontal dimension was analysed in greater depth (Benz et al. 1992). Case studies about Germany (Scheller / Schmid 2008) and the EU (Falkner 2011) gather in edited volumes, so that many policies are covered for Germany and the EU. A case study about school policy deals with party politics and joint-decision making in Germany (Heinz 2015). Also, the concept of joint-decision making is applied in the Literature to Canada (Painter 1991), the EU (Peters 1997) and Scandinavia (Blom-Hansen 1999). Usually main discussions with regards to joint-decision making are related to exploring whether a policy, an institutional system or an institution itself is trapped in joint decision making or not. Few examples, however, are known and acknowledged to show that political actors are indeed trapped in joint-decision making. In addition, the focus of the academic literature lies more on the joint-decision trap and not in joint-decision making, although the trap only rarely occurs.

Contemporary Debates

The topic of joint-decision making is a middle range theory as Fritz Scharpf himself declared many times, because it covers the German case and the case of the European Union / Community. The application of the concept of joint-decision making has been relatively rare in scholarship limited to Germany, Canada (Painter 1991) and Scandinavia (Blom-Hansen 1999). It seems worthwhile, therefore, to widen this research agenda and apply the concept of joint-decision making to other federal states. For the German case, the concept is still of practical relevance, although many forms of coordination have changed over time, but no formal or institutional reforms took place. For example, joint tasks were heavily debated in the past, but they still are also of practical importance at least for German politics.

Concluding Reflections

To conclude, it can be said that Joint-decision making is a characteristic of the German and European federal political system. It enables also a way out of the enduring question of the European Union / Community if there should be more or less centralisation or decentralisation. An answer in favour of Joint-decision making would be that the mix of centralization and decentralisation would be dynamic so that negative aspects would be diminished and positive aspects of (de)centralisation would be increased. But against this statement, the concept of joint-decision making had to face demand for abolishment in the forefront of the first federal reform in Germany.

At least in the cases of Germany and the EU the situation seems to be far away in terms of abolishing joint-decision making, because that was publicly postulated in the past. Obviously joint-decision making proved to be more robust than expected beforehand. Hence, future research would need to discover joint-decision making also in other institutional contexts that is to say in other federal systems.

 

Bibliography

Benz, Arthur / Jessica Detemple / Dominic Heinz (2016a) Varianten und Dynamiken der Politikverflechtung im deutschen Bundesstaat (Nomos: Baden-Baden).

Benz, Arthur / Dominic Heinz / Eike-Christian Horning / Bettina Petersohn / Andrea Fischer-Hotzel and Jörg Kemmerzell (2016b) Constitutional Policy in Multilevel-Systems. The Art of Keeping the balance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Benz, Arthur / Jörg Broschek (Eds.) (2013) Federal Dynamics Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Benz, Arthur / Fritz W. Scharpf / Reinhard Zintl (1992) Horizontale Politikverflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag).

Blom-Hansen, Jens (1999) Avoiding the joint-decision trap: Lessons from intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia, in: European Journal of Political Research (35) 35-67.

Heinz, Dominic (2015) Politikverflechtung in der Schulpolitik: Koordination im Wandel, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 56 (4) 626-647.

Painter, Martin (1991) Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis, in: Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24 (2) 269-288.

Peters, B. Guy (1997) Escaping the joint-decision trap: Repetition and sectoral politics in the EU, in: West European Politics 20 (2) 22-36.

Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988) The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, in: Public Administration, 66 (3) 239-278.

Scharpf, Fritz / Bernd Reissert / Fritz Schnabel (1976) Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Scriptor: Kronberg).

Scheller, Henrik / Josef Schmid (2008) Föderale Politikgestaltung im deutschen Bundesstaat: Variable Verflechtungsmuster in Politikfeldern. (Nomos: Baden-Baden).

 

Further Reading

Scharpf, Fritz / Bernd Reissert / Fritz Schnabel (1976) Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Scriptor: Kronberg).

Benz, Arthur / Jessica Detemple / Dominic Heinz (2016a) Varianten und Dynamiken der Politikverflechtung im deutschen Bundesstaat (Nomos: Baden-Baden).

Benz, Arthur / Jörg Broschek (Eds.) (2013) Federal Dynamics Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Scharpf, Fritz (1988) The Joint-decision trap: Lessons from German federalism and European integration, in: Public Administration 66 (3) 239–278.

Falkner, Gerda (2011) The EUs Decision Traps. Comparing Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Posted by Dominic Heinz in Policies, Theory, 0 comments
Condominiums and Shared Sovereignty

Condominiums and Shared Sovereignty

Abstract

As the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU), the future of Gibraltar, appears to be in peril. Like Northern Ireland, Gibraltar borders with EU territory and strongly relies on its ties with Spain for its economic stability, transports and energy supplies. Although the Gibraltarian government is struggling to preserve both its autonomy with British sovereignty and accession to the European Union, the Spanish government states that only a form of joint-sovereignty would save Gibraltar from the same destiny as the rest of UK in case of complete withdrawal from the EU, without any accession to the European Economic Area (Hard Brexit). The purpose of this paper is to present the concept of Condominium as a federal political system based on joint-sovereignty and, by presenting the existing case of Condominiums (i.e. Andorra). The paper will assess if there are margins for applying a Condominium solution to Gibraltar.

 

Condominium in History and Political Theory

The Latin word condominium comes from the union of the Latin prefix con (from cum, with) and the word dominium (rule). Watts (2008: 11) mentioned condominiums among one of the forms of federal political systems. As the word suggests, it is a form of shared sovereignty involving two or more external parts exercising a joint form of sovereignty over the same area, sometimes in the form of direct control, and sometimes while conceding or maintaining forms of self-government on the subject area, occasionally in a relationship of suzerainty (Shepheard, 1899).

Condominiums date back to the Middle Ages as an ancient form to settle rivalries and conflicts between states vying for supremacy over the same territories. According to historical reports, the condominium was a Byzantine invention. In the seventh century, Emperor Justinian II proposed a new form of shared sovereignty to Caliph Muawiyah I over Cyprus and its tax revenues (Zavagno, 2011). This arrangement lasted for almost three centuries, before the Byzantines won the island back.

In British colonial history, the case of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is one of the clearest examples of a condominium between a colonial power and a regional territory, with the latter under the influence of the former. This agreement provided mutual assistance over a disputed territory, and shared responsibilities on security over an extended territory. Although called a condominium, which implies a form of equality of parts, in this form of [imposed] agreement, the British played a hegemonic role by frustrating the Egyptians’ demands in the area, as well as indigenous Sudanese demands for independence and self-rule. The Vanuatu Islands and Togoland (1916-1922) are other examples, whereby both were colonial condominiums under shared sovereignty between France and Great Britain.

Because of their nature, Condominiums are a fragile form of federal political system. Their success as a peaceful solution to inter-state conflicts relies on the agreement and good will of the parts to respect such an arrangement. With the sole exception of Andorra, which has lasted for centuries and still exists (see below), condominiums are not permanent arrangements. Although condominiums are often created because of immediate peace-making circumstances, most of the time they have been superseded by new settlements favouring one of the external parts or determining the full independence of the condominium. The partition of Togoland between France and Great Britain in 1922, the partition of Samoa between Germany and the USA in 1899 and the transfer of Krakow under full Austrian sovereignty in 1846, are cases in point.

Andorra: A Quintessential Condominium

Andorra is a microstate which conserves some elements of ancient political systems that have managed to survive and adapt to new and evolving circumstances. Whereby San Marino is the last surviving example of a medieval Italian comune, and Liechtenstein the last surviving principality from the Holy Roman Empire, Andorra is the last surviving example of a feudal agreement (Fernsworth, 1934).

Andorra represents a condominium which has been established since the Middle Ages. Legends report that Charlemagne himself, because of the area’s imperviousness and strategic position, founded the settlement after securing the Pyrenean Mountains from the Moors. Louis the Pious, Charlemagne’s son and successor, gave control of the settlement to the counts of Urgell and their successors. The status of Co-principality, i.e. having two heads of states sharing the same role over Andorra, is a consequence of this decision. Much conflict ensued between the Counts of Foix, heirs of the local secular lords in charge of Andorra military control and security and the Bishops of Urgell, in charge of its civil and religious administration. This conflict was solved through the so called Andorran Paréage. ‘Contracts of Paréage’ (literally: agreements between peers) (Delcambre & Gallet, 1937) represented a way to settle territorial disputes between two parts by sharing sovereignty over a contested territory. With the Andorran Pareage, in a framework of mutual recognition and parity, the Counts of Foix and the Bishops of Urgell both became sovereign over Andorra. At the same time, they continued developing some form of self-rule.

The Parishes (small towns organised around a church) emerged as political units, in which the wealthiest family was the main political player as representatives of their own Parish. With the end of Francoist regime in Spain and its transition to democracy, Andorra also underwent a long phase of political reforms and modernisation during the 1970s and the 1980s, when the co-princes agreed on the necessity of new democratic governance for the Pyrenean condominium. This was agreed through mediation with the Council of Europe, which demanded a formal modernisation of the Andorran system according to liberal-democratic standards. An executive branch, with a head of government and a council of ministers, was first established in 1981 and, after several years of constitutional wrangling and negotiations as well as public consultations, Andorra ratified its new constitution in 1993 (Butletí Oficial del Principat d’Andorra, 1993). Under the new constitution, the role of the two Head of States (co-princes, namely the president of France and the Bishop of Urgell) is mainly ceremonial, but nonetheless, they retain a veto-power in the case that one of them does not ratify laws. In all the other features, Andorra is an independent country, with its own system of government and specificities.

A Condominium Solution for Gibraltar?

Gibraltar has been and remains a contentious issue in relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain since the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which forced Spain to accept British sovereignty over Gibraltar and Menorca as a result of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). While Spain managed to reconquer Menorca in subsequent wars in the 18th century, it failed in reconquer ‘the Rock’.  Despite the evolution of good relations between post-Franco Spain and the UK, in addition to the involvement of both countries in the wider European integration project, Spain has never completely abandoned its claim over Gibraltar.

In the early 2000s, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ana Palacio proposed a form of joint sovereignty and condominium status for Gibraltar. Although the negotiations were supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Gibraltar Parliament unilaterally called a referendum to stop any option involving joint sovereignty. Voters unanimously rejected the negotiations (98.48% voted against, with a turnout of 87.9%) and any plan for joint sovereignty. Gibraltarian hostility towards this project was linked to Spanish proposals that the condominium would not be permanent, but a preliminary phase before being placed under full Spanish sovereignty.

In light of the referendum, the Spanish and the British governments started, along with the Gibraltarian government, a tripartite forum of dialogue. Established in 2006, the forum sought to manage many concrete issues, but did not provide a framework for resolving the issue of Gibraltar’s sovereignty (Gold, 2009). That forum, supported by the Spanish Zapatero government, faced harsh opposition from the subsequent Rajoy led administration, which essentially boycotted it. This ‘boycott’, in place since 2011 led to a de facto dismissal of the forum. The reason for this disagreement can be found in the Spanish attitude towards Gibraltar’s status; while Spain would support a condominium solution and shared sovereignty with the UK, it concomitantly refuses to accept Gibraltar as an autonomous or semi-sovereign counterpart in the negotiation.

The results of the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU has caused a further rift between Spain and the UK. On the 23rd of June, Gibraltar almost unanimously rejected leaving the EU (96% on a turnout of 83.7%). Although its status could to some extent be compared to Scotland and Northern Ireland, which both voted for remain, both the overwhelming percentage in favour of remaining and the high turnout in the referendum represent a strong case for Gibraltar to remain part of the EU. As a British oversea territory and Special Member State Territory with the EU, Gibraltar is outside the Common External Tariff and the obligation to levy Value Added Tax but, more importantly it has its own autonomy in complying with EU directives. Despite this status, the UK is legally responsible for Gibraltar’s external relations and consequently for Gibraltar’s EU membership. Thus, Gibraltar, alongside the rest of the UK (Scotland and Northern Ireland included), is expected to leave the EU. Under these circumstances, could a form of joint sovereignty with Spain be a solution to this puzzle?

Although Gibraltar is strongly opposed to joint sovereignty, such an agreement could embed Gibraltar in the EU. Gibraltar would become a co-principality (by having two heads of states like Andorra), and would retain its self-government, while being linked to both the EU and the UK after the latter’s withdrawal. The Spanish government stated immediately after the referendum that Gibraltar was a step closer to joining Spain.  Nonetheless, Gibraltarians have remained very sceptical about this solution; Gibraltarian Chief Minister Mr. Fabian Picardo dismissed any Spanish demand for joint sovereignty and stated that Gibraltar would find other ways to preserve its status in the EU.  The fear of Spanish centralism and the will to maintain the political and fiscal autonomy granted by being a British overseas territory remains a major issue between Spain and Gibraltar. Just after the referendum, Mr. Picardo stated that joint-sovereignty is a price that Gibraltar is not willing to pay.

A solution to the status of Gibraltar relies partly on the will of Spain and the UK to negotiate the status of condominium and partly on the citizens of Gibraltar. In the case of Hard Brexit and a negative outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the UK, Gibraltar would have to look for a solution that does not imply separation from the Single Market and the economic cooperation with Spain. Additionally, despite Mr. Picardo’s hostility, it is not clear how a possible “joint-sovereignty solution” could affect Gibraltar’s autonomy so significantly. In fact, should the UK and Spain negotiate an “Andorra solution” for Gibraltar, with the monarchs of the two countries acting as co-monarchs, Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar would be mainly ceremonial and would not actually affect Gibraltar’s autonomy. Other solutions involving a more consistent role for the Spanish government, as much as for the British government, would represent a model of condominium with more limited self-rule for Gibraltar, but currently this appears unpopular amongst inhabitants of the Rock. Should Gibraltar keep refusing this option, the only path it can follow is to lobby the UK government for a soft Brexit ot a possible special status for Gibraltar.

Conclusion

While it remains unclear how the future of Gibraltar will develop as the negotiations between the EU and UK unfold, condominiums represent a model for federal political systems that has the advantage to mitigate conflicts and accommodate more actors. It has the advantage to be a flexible model, which has been applicable in colonial and post-colonial realities, as well as in very different cases. Andorra, for instance, remains the prototypical example of a condominium. In this case, an Andorra-style condominium solution for Gibraltar could provide some possibilities to accommodate the demands of all parties in the future of the Rock, yet until a solution is found, the future of Gibraltar remains at stake.

 

Bibliography

Butletí Oficial del Principat d’Andorra (1993). Constitució del Principat d’Andorra. Available at https://www.bopa.ad/bopa/005024/Pagines/7586.aspx.

Etienne, D., Gallet, L. (1937). Les traités de paréage dans la France féodale. Paris, librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1936. Gr. in-8°, 233 pages. Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, 98(1), pp.153-155.

Daly, M.W. (2002). Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934-1956. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fernsworth, L. (1934). Andorra: The Passing of Europe’s Last Feudal State. Foreign Affairs, 12(2), 335-338. doi:10.2307/20030590

Gold, P. (2009). The Tripartite Forum of Dialogue: Is this the Solution to the ‘Problem’ of Gibraltar? Mediterranean Politics, 14(1), pp 79-97. Doi: 10.1080/13629390902747475

Perkins, T.C., 2014. Edification from the Andorran model: a brief exploration into the condominium solution on the international stage and its potential application to current land disputes. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 21(2), pp.643-665.

Shepheard, W.P., (1899). Suzerainty. Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, pp.432-438.

Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. Kingston: Queen’s University Press.

Zavagno, L. (2011). At the Edge of Two Empires: The Economy of Cyprus between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (650s-800s CE). Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 67, pp. 121-56.

 

Further Reading

Elazar, D.J. (1987). Exploring federalism. University of Alabama Press.

Mickoleit, A. (2010). April. Andorra. In Elections in Europe (pp. 149-168). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

Samuels, J.H., 2007. Condominium arrangements in international practice: reviving an abandoned concept of boundary dispute resolution. Mich. J. Int’l L., 29, p.727.

Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. Kingston: Queen’s University Press.

 

Posted by Francesco Violi in Case studies, Theory, 0 comments
Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy

Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy

Abstract

Non-Territorial Cultural Autonomy (NTCA) advocates the creation of minority rights regimes in societies that are culturally diverse, but which for a variety of reasons are not wholly suited to federal solutions. In this contribution, I examine the long history of NCTA, drawing upon a number of empirical examples to substantiate the claims made by both is supporters and detractors. In the final section, I turn to the contemporary relevance of NCTA, concluding that while assessments on the efficacy of NTCA tend to be rather gloomy, it is a solution that should not be readily dismissed, particularly in a world replete with dysfunctional and failed states.

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Posted by Karl Cordell in Diversity management, Theory, 0 comments
Self-Rule and Shared Rule

Self-Rule and Shared Rule

Abstract

‘Self-rule’ and ‘shared rule’ are two widely used notions to define, describe and classify federal political systems. In this contribution, I define what these two concepts mean, particularly in the context of federal studies, as well as discuss the different understandings and practices of them. Drawing upon the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016), I present a number of variables that can be used to measure the self-rule and shared rule dimensions of federal political systems.

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Posted by Sean Mueller in Theory, 0 comments
Federalism and Federation: Putting the Record Straight

Federalism and Federation: Putting the Record Straight

Abstract

The terms ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ are well entrenched concepts in the political science literature, yet remain contested because in practice people have different understandings of the terms federal, federalism and federation. In this short piece I set out the importance of definitional clarity when discussing the abovementioned terms. Secondly, I discuss the relationship between liberal democracy and federalism, noting that a number of values that undergird federal political systems equally fit with democratic principles. In the final section, I focus on the some of the misunderstood aspects of federalism, using the British case as an empirical example.

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Posted by Michael Burgess in Theory, 0 comments