Intergovernmental Relations

The Three Shades of American Federalism

The Three Shades of American Federalism

Abstract

Donald Trump is a transgressive president elected by a minority of voters but elevated to the White House by a quintessential institution of American federalism, the Electoral College. However, the federal system otherwise poses significant barriers to transgressive behaviour because it is a complex mix of dualism, intergovernmental cooperation, and national coercion. The system’s constitutional dualism allows space for autonomous state policy-making. The system’s rule-bound and bureaucratic structures of intergovernmental policy implementation limit the ability of one president to substantially alter this cooperative dimension of the system. The long-run trend, though, is toward greater centralization and federal government coercion of state and local governments.

 

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Posted by John Kincaid in Case Studies, 0 comments
What Can Cannabis Legalisation Teach Us About Canadian Federalism?

What Can Cannabis Legalisation Teach Us About Canadian Federalism?

Abstract

“Executive”, “Collaborative”, “Court”, “Conflicting” or “Judicial”, Canadian federalism is depicted in eclectic terms in the academic literature. Looking at cannabis legalization in Canada, this article aims to highlight what can be revealed from the policy-making process in a federal system in which a variety of actors and orders of government are involved. It appears from the analysis that there is no hegemony of style in Canadian federalism, but rather intertwined competing dynamics at stake in the making of a single public policy.


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Posted by Maude Benoit and Gabriel Lévesque in Policies, 0 comments
Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Ubiquitous, Idiosyncratic, Opaque and Essential

Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Ubiquitous, Idiosyncratic, Opaque and Essential

Abstract

Regardless of institutional design, all federal systems imply substantial degrees of interaction between federal partners. “Intergovernmental relations” (IGR) refer to the many modalities through which this interaction takes place. IGR take many shapes and forms. They fluctuate with time and according to policy areas. In this sense, they are idiosyncratic. They are, however, the essential “oil in the machinery” of every federal system, and as such may be rather ubiquitous. Following a short incursion in the terminological challenges relating to intergovernmental relations (and its companion: “comparative federalism”), this article explores the actors in the IGR game as well as the rich catalogue of legislative – and mostly executive-techniques on which these actors rely to structure their relations. IGR waltz between institutionalization and informality, often in an opaque fashion which tends to reinforce the executive branch of each federal partner.
This brief overview of IGR from a comparative perspective suggests that federations grounded in the “continental civil law tradition” are more likely to structure IGR through legal mechanisms and norms than their more pragmatic “common law” counterparts. Though this is a significant simplification, the latter tend to consider IGR primarily (if not exclusively) through a political lens. Yet – somewhat paradoxically – regardless of informality and legal status, IGR play similar functions in various federal systems. Coordination functions, of course. But also para-constitutional engineering ones, through which federal actors (generally the various executives) implicitly alter the official federal architecture.

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Posted by Johanne Poirier in Theory, 0 comments
The Pleasant Greyness of Australian Federalism

The Pleasant Greyness of Australian Federalism

Abstract

This article provides an overview of Australian federalism, describing its origins, design, features, evolution, and issues. Its central theme is the way that, in the notable absence of a ‘federal society’, a system that was decentralised in design and intent has given way to one much more centralised in practice. The issues that plague Australian federalism are the practical ones of fiscal federalism and intergovernmental relations.

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Posted by Alan Fenna in Case Studies, 0 comments
Are Cities Constituent Units in Brazil’s Federalism?

Are Cities Constituent Units in Brazil’s Federalism?

Abstract

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that municipalities (cities) are part of the federal union. This statement reflects the relevance of local governments in Brazil’s federation. The federal structure does not guarantee municipalities the same level of federative ground the states have. However, municipal competences and roles established by the constitution and the dynamic of Brazilian federalism have shown a high level of participation of local governments in Brazil’s federation.

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Posted by Gilberto M. A. Rodrigues in Case Studies, 0 comments