Postcolonial Federalism and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Abstract

For decades, debate has revolved around whether the Islamic Republic of Pakistan qualifies as a federation. This uncertainty originates from the lack of democratic credentials within Pakistan’s federal system and its multilevel operations. Often ignored is Pakistan’s colonial history and the legacies of colonial rule that have aided and abetted this status quo. Postcolonial Federalism advocates a relationship between the de jure and de facto legacies of colonial rule and Pakistan’s current federal dynamics. It emphasises the importance of colonial socio-political engineering and the inheritance of institutions after independence in 1947. To understand the social reality of federations such as Pakistan, it is essential to detach from the Western frameworks and objectives of federalism as we know them.

Introduction

For far too long, many scholars of federalism and multilevel governance from the Global South have tried to apply Western research frameworks to their respective federations for the feasibility of publications and scholarly appreciation. The theories and objectives of federalism are often antithetical to the analysis provided in the literature. Most fail to depict the social reality and de facto operation of governance and rule of law within these multiethnic federations.

Let me emphasise. Federalism is not a dogma. How federations operate is also not always analogous. Every federation rests on its unique socio-historic evolution. The federal systems of operation are distinct and exhibit their own political, social, and fiscal realities. However, neither is the comparison of federations a question of binaries nor a completely lexical ordeal.

Federations with a colonial history remain an understudied topic in federalism. Are there shades of correlation between colonialism and federalism, or is there direct causation? Candid scrutiny of the federal evolution and current dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan showcases elements of both.

When British colonial administrators responsible for governance in ex-colonies of the Empire decided to implement legal pluralism and conduct an overhaul of social affairs, Postcolonial Federalism was inevitable.

 

The Concept of Postcolonial Federalism

Literature on federalism, from the Federalist Papers to recent work on its intertwined relationship with democracy, advocates for a particular set of fundamental principles. Federalism is not just about creating multiple levels of governance; it has also been advocated as a contractual phenomenon between stakeholding regions based on the values of trust, reciprocity, sharing, and mutual recognition – on the pillars of unity and cohesion. Going as far as being compared to the relationship between Man and God (Elazar 1987: 5). However, not all federations emerged from the same backdrop. The concept of Postcolonial Federalism acts as a safeguard against the notion that not all federations are products of a democratic, liberal or contractual phenomenon.

Postcolonial Federalism is a novel lens for understanding state formation and the legacies of colonial rule in India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan—all ex-colonies of the British Empire. Most of the work on the genesis of federations focuses on the period of federalisation and the arbitration of becoming a federation.

Instead, Postcolonial Federalism has its roots in the conceptual groundwork of the period preceding the formation of the federations. The concept injects importance into the density and potency of colonial rule, its administration, legal frameworks of operation, and the federal bargain that evolved before decolonisation.

Postcolonial Federalism – as its etymological preface suggests – focuses on the trajectory of federations once colonial rule had officially ended. It rests its analysis on the legacies of colonial rule that the federations of India, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan cradle since independence. However, understanding the standards of practice within these federations is seldom possible without focusing on the historical development that led to the federal moment.

To base its methodological stance and framework, the concept arguably makes its most significant contribution in understanding how federations are created. Postcolonial Federalism dissects Alfred Stepan’s (1999) three-prong typology of federations under 1) Coming-Together Federalism (Example: The United States of America, 2) Holding-Together Federalism (Example: Spain and Belgium), and 3) Putting-Together Federalism (Example: The Soviet Union). The concept then argues that some federations, including India, which Stepan (1999) categorised under Holding-Together Federalism, do not fit any of the three typologies provided by Stepan. However, they may include some characteristics from all of Stepan’s categories.

The concept creates a small universe of cases where British colonial rule had governed its ex-colonies into federations instead of showcasing a contractual arrangement between regions based on the values highlighted earlier in this section. It is also pertinent to mention that the concept emphasises an identical point of departure for all cases. Still, it does not advocate the same level of postcolonial within these federations. It also does not take away weightage from the rigorous anti-colonial nationalist movements before the independence of these federations. Instead, it lends weight to the variation in the evolution of these federations, which are subject to reflection and reforms carried out by the respective independent states.

For example, a stark difference can be seen in the Pakistani and Indian federations on the subject of feudalism and the social power of the feudal elite. The Indian federation abolished the institutionalised variant of feudalism, the Zamindari System, through its 1950 Constitution. This marvel of colonial engineering introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 through the Permanent Settlement Act continued in Pakistan. Even though the Pakistani Federation’s Land Reform Commission 1959 abolished the colonial structure of Zamindari, it still permitted an individual to hold 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of non-irrigated land. This allowed the continuation of feudalism in its rawest essence – despite the cosmetic reforms.

Popelier (2021:2) sees the current moment in federal studies at a standstill because of the lack of theoretical foundation in comparative analysis and old theories proving inadequate to understanding new systems of dispersed political authority. Postcolonial Federalism attempts to fill this gap, at least for its suggested cases.

 

Reforms, Commissions, Reports, Acts: The Legal Push Towards Federalism

Although the Sub-Continent historically displayed elements of self-rule and shared-rule, especially during the Mughal Dynasty, the perfection of its afterthought came during British colonial rule, in continuation of what Burgess (1995) labelled as the British tradition of federalism. Indeed, the British have remained the most prolific creators of federations without adopting a federal model for themselves.

By the start of the 18^th century, the East India Company had evolved their trading posts in Bengal, Madras and Bombay into regional kingdoms. By the 19^th century, each presidency had a distinct approach to confronting its problems. The idea was that competing independent states in India would produce a rather enduring general political order than a single regime, even a British one (Rudolph and Rudolph 2010: 561).

By 1833, the Utilitarian government in power at Westminster began the centralisation process of India (Adeney 2007: 30). This move consolidated power at the centre (Bengal), abolishing the councils of Madras and Bombay, revoking their legislative powers and rendering them financially dependent on Bengal – initiating a multilevel outlook.

The introduction of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 enlarged the Governor-General’s executive committee to form a legislative council at the centre, reestablishing a federal state form. This led to the reconstitution and enlargement of provincial legislative councils in many provinces, including Madras, Bombay, the North-Western Provinces, and Punjab.

The most federal-ish colonial legislation since the Act of 1861 came in the shape of the Government of India Act 1919, also known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The Act led to the realisation of self-government in India, establishing a ‘Dyarchy’ with the division of the executive and provincial governments. The Government of India Act 1919 constitutionalised multilevel governance in India for the first time.

An even more federalising colonial bargain came in the shape of the Government of India Act 1935, based on the ideas of an All-Indian Federation. The Act further granted provincial autonomy to regions, with legislative powers divided between the central government and provinces. The Act also introduced a Federal Court. The bargains within the Act of 1935 seem relevant to the needs of the time but substantially differ from the federal covenant of political leaders and their agency to choose. The final nail to unitary solutions for all stakeholders (including the 580+ Princely States)  in the Sub-Continent came through the Indian Act of Independence of 1947.

Waseem (2011: 215) places the context in content, stating that Pakistan’s incongruent political reality left a situation where 1) Federalism was the only option for a viable form of government and 2) It was designed to be as toothless as possible. The bargain brought by the coloniser left a federal structure as the only option to regain sovereignty.

 

Decolonisation and Postcolonial Pakistan: A Unique Multiethnic Federation

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is one of the most unique federations in the world. It is one of only two nation-states that came into being in the name of religion and the only federation. The complexity of its formation bears testimony to its federal complexities in the status quo. A multi-ethnic federation born out of colonialism, with the only common factor and extension within its territorial boundaries being religion—that of Islam.

For Postcolonial Federations, the question that needs to be asked to understand the operation and evolution of the federation is, “Who inherits the State?” (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016). For Pakistan, the dominant ethnicity that inherited the State comes from Punjab. Not only did the Punjabis inherit the State based on demographic numbers, but also due to their Garrison-State relations with the departing coloniser.

The other ethnicity that took the initial charge of State institutions was the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs (immigrants). These were muslims who migrated to the Federation of Pakistan from the Indian Federation right after decolonisation. Most middle and upper-class Mohajirs came equipped with higher education and civil service experience working for the British Raj administration and the muslim Princely States.  However, their numbers and power within State institutions slowly eroded as well.

From the lens of asymmetrical federalism and regional autonomy, multiethnic federations prioritise the preservation of subnational identities. In most cases, ethnolinguistic necessities are given preferential treatment. The federal idea revolving around an ethnicity’s historical identity is primary, and the federal identity is often secondary – or both go hand in hand without too much warrant.

In the case of Pakistan, nation and state-building prioritised the national federal identity over regional ethnic identities. In this case, the federal identity is an amalgamation of three factors. First, all Pakistanis are flagbearers of Islam as muslims. Secondly, they are Pakistani, and lastly, if there is any room remaining, they can be Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun or Baloch – among other ethnicities that rest in the federation. Only one of the four provinces in the federation, Sindh, offers some form of MTB-MLE (mother tongue-based multilingual education). None of the subnational units has their respective ethnic language as the language of operation for provincial governance or as the language of instruction in public schools.

As Sanjaume-Calvet (2018) states, if federalism has 50 shades, secession is certainly one of them. One of the critical reasons for the secession of East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh) was the federation’s dismissal of Bengali as one of the national languages. This, coupled with the illogical geographical proximity (a 2000-kilometer distance) between West and East Pakistan, was a recipe for disaster since the federation’s inception.

 

Legacies of Colonial Rule and Postcolonial Inheritance

Colonial legacies is a term often thrown around in literature without any explication of variance. The concept of Postcolonial Federalism offers this bifurcation, stating a clear distinction between de jure and de facto colonial legacies.

De jure colonial legacies: strictly appreciate the laws, policies, and legislations implemented during colonial rule and were constitutionalised by the newly independent states. For example, a marvel of colonial legislation, the Indian Penal Code of 1860 and its provisions on Sedition charges are still being implemented in the Pakistani Federation. Article 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860 authorises the State to arrest any individual if they “excite disaffection towards the Federal or Provincial Government established by law….”.

De facto colonial legacies: loosely appreciate the many social habits adopted from colonial rule still practised in the newly independent states. For example, the Pakistani Federation does not offer any regional language as the language of operation in governance apart from Urdu and English. Although English is not an official language of the state, since its independence, its functioning has lingered as the alternate language of operation for federal or provincial governments. Unrestricted to the use of English in governance, it is also believed to be the language of preference for upward social mobility, both in the public and private sectors.

 

“If men were government, no angels would be necessary”: Pakistan’s Federal Dynamics

James Madison, the father of the American Constitution and, to some extent, federalism, states in Federalist Paper 51: “If men were angels, no government would necessary.” Even with its Hobbesian paternalistic connotations, the quote makes much more sense than the practice of governance in the Pakistani federation.

For the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, I contest the quote altered as: “If men were government, no angels would be necessary.” The subpar standards of governance result from synthetic adversities through institutions that inherently propel a colonial character. On the one hand, religion is enshrined in the federation’s Constitution through its Preamble – where power devolved to chosen representatives is at the behest of Allah Almighty (God). On the other, the Constitution runs its paternalistic legal affairs through the colonial British Code of Criminal Procedure framework, showcasing legal pluralism.

This hybridity of the Pakistani federation’s evolution through its religious code of conduct, on the back of a postcolonial legal framework, has produced a marvel of federalism. The zealously religious outlook and structure of society, intertwined with decadence and moral corruption of institutions, makes the federation stand out. The Pakistani Federation does not find its inception nor functioning in the federal adage of “unity in diversity”, albeit it finds its functioning principle through “unity in religion”. In the federal universe of liberalism and non-interference of religion in State affairs, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has stood out.

If democratic indicators for Pakistan do not satisfy the West’s demands or propose high credentials, it has not happened in a vacuum. Cramped in one of the most challenging geopolitical locations and situations, accompanied by hostile neighbours and a history of international conflict – the federation’s necessity has birthed an authoritarian persona. Since 1948, the federations of Pakistan and India have been at loggerheads. The constant military engagement and armed conflict resulted in nuclear proliferation for both federations and increased spending on defence, especially for Pakistan. Consequently, higher fiscal allocation for the military meant less pivot provided to other federal necessities, such as health, education or infrastructure.

Thus, did British colonial state formation play a part in causing Pakistan to attain this federal reality and structure? Postcolonial Federalism argues yes.

 

Conclusion

I have argued that British colonial socio-political engineering was the pivotal factor in the federalisation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. I contend that the structure and functioning of institutions inherited from the British Raj inherently propel a colonial character and stand averse to all theories and objectives of democracy and federalism. The legacies of colonial rule, both de jure and de facto, continue to play a part in the status quo. The amalgamation of religion and an authoritarian pizazz in multiethnic settings creates complexities that remain unique to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. However, all hope is not lost. The beauty of federalism is such that it always offers hope – as a tool kit – for rational solutions. The myriad of inherited and self-invoked problems in the federation can be overcome through multilevel solutions and lessons from other federal experiences. To reach positive ends, a certainty that Postcolonial Federalism recommends is for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to recognise, acknowledge, and reform its inherited colonial legacies, which the federation so obviously cradles.

[This piece is a contracted version of the author’s PhD thesis article, Postcolonial Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis for Tracing State-Formation in the Global South]

Khoso, S. (2024). Postcolonial Federalism: A Conceptual Analysis for Tracing State-Formation in the Global South. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2024.2359795

Suggested citation: Khoso, S. (2024). “Postcolonial Federalism and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, 50 Shades of Federalism

 

References

Adeney, K. 2007. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230601949.

Elazar, D.J. 1987. Exploring federalism. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa.

Madison, J. 1788. Federalist No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. The Federalist Papers. Retrieved from the Avalon Project: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.

Popelier, P. 2021. Dynamic Federalism: A New Theory for Cohesion and Regional Autonomy. 1^st Edition. Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003128762

Rudolph, L.I. and Hoeber Rudolph, S. 2010. Federalism as State Formation in India: A Theory of Shared and Negotiated Sovereignty. International Political Science Review 31(5). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110388634.

Sanjaume-Calvet, M. 2018. ‘Secession and Federalism: A Chiaroscuro’. 50 Shades of Federalism. Available at: https://50shadesoffederalism.com/diversity-management/secession-federalism-chiaroscuro/

Stepan, A. 1999. Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model. Journal of Democracy 10(4).

Watts, R.L. 1965. Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations. Annual Review of Political Science. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.117.

Watts, R.L. 1966. New Federations. Experiments in the Commonwealth. International Journal, 22.

Watts, R.L. 2008. Comparing Federal Systems (3rd ed.). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Waseem, M. 2011. Pakistan: A Majority-Constraining Federalism. India Quarterly: 213-28. Available at: JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45073024

Wucherpfennig, J., Hunziker, P. and Cederman, L.E. 2016. Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Postcolonial Conflict. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12236

 

Further reading

Bhattacharyya, H. 2020. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nepal, and Myanmar (2nd ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367821630.

Burset, C. R. 2023. An Empire of Laws: Legal Pluralism in British Colonial Policy. Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.5666741

Knox, B. 1971. The Rise of Colonial Federation as an Object of British Policy, 1850-1870. Journal of British Studies, 11(1): 92-112. doi:10.1086/385619

Tudor, M. 2013. The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan. Cambridge University Press.