Unlocking the Cyprus Peace Process: Backstops could be an option

Abstract

Backstops could be best defined as a form of safeguard or contingency plan, that aim to guarantee a certain positive outcome regardless of the outcome of a negotiation. In Cyprus and peace negotiations across conflict zones, a “backstop” could refer to a fallback arrangement that will kick in if parties fail to reach a comprehensive settlement. While we do not necessarily advocate for any specific backstop, in this article we aim to present the wider architecture and process design, examples from around the world as well as a feasible range of alternatives for Cyprus.

 

Backstops have gained prominence in UN and international mediations, from Northern Ireland and Ukraine to Syria and Cyprus leaving audiences puzzled on their potentially positive effects on prolonged stalemates. While catchy (in English), the term cannot be always widely understood or translated in other languages (Greek: προληπτικός μηχανισμός or δικλείδα ασφαλείας; Turkish: önlem mekanizması or tedbir mekanizması).

So far negotiations in Cyprus have been based “on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” that has contributed to little progress in reuniting Cyprus and in fact the longest ever stalemate since 2017.  We advocate instead an approach that effectively flips this logic aiming for some progress and agreements to be implemented until everything is agreed incentivizing at the same time a comprehensive settlement. We encourage the UN and all sides to think in terms of backstop mechanisms across a wide range of issues (e.g. security, implementation, human rights and demographic) and to introduce explicitly a backstop terminology in a revived process.

 

Source: The World Factbook

We also draw on successful international precedents. A most recent example is the Irish backstop (formally the Northern Ireland Protocol) negotiated at the start of the Brexit talks as an insurance against a hard border on the island of Ireland until an alternative negotiated settlement had been agreed between the UK and the EU. Irish and external mediators entered the talks knowing that regardless of the outcome a hard border will not be unilaterally imposed among the possible outcomes. Utilizing public opinion surveys on Northern Ireland/Brexit has confirmed in advance that there was a zone of possible agreement once the backstop mechanism has been established.[i] Ironically, Cyprus had its own mini-backstop during the Brexit talks that produced a safeguard against a legal limbo on the Sovereign British Bases (SBS) avoiding disruption in the movement of people, goods and services. [ii]

Backstop mechanisms could include confidence building measures and incentives for parties to initiate talks or control for damage in the Trump Ukraine negotiations. UK PM Sir Keir Starmer has recently called for a US security backstop for Ukraine (this for the event that Russia reneges on its commitments asking the US to provide support to EU and other peacekeepers on the ground).[iii] Part of the logic of this proposal draws on Bosnia (the Dayton precedent) where NATO and the international community provided such security and implementation backstops that secured human rights often against the wishes of local politicians. The same analogy might not be applicable to Ukraine because of its own unique security dynamics yet it is important to note that backstops might not be limited to security and implementation (e.g. human rights backstop might involve third mechanisms to support Ukrainian returnees post-settlement).

For decades peace talks in Cyprus have missed this dimension (a possible exception was the Matthew Nimetz plan in 1978 for the return of Varosha regardless of the outcome of the talks). The Annan Plan and the Crans Montana summit came close to reaching a deal but failed to include pre-determined backstops (the Green Line regulation was introduced retrospectively and did not fulfil the expectations of Turkish Cypriots who mobilized for a ‘yes’ vote in 2004). Likewise, Crans Montana has further deepened the logic of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ stipulated in the earlier Anastasiades and Eroğlu joint declaration. At the time that the UN has confirmed the stalemate in Cyprus, Matthew Nimetz himself brokered the Prespa agreement between Greece and North Macedonia following earlier interim agreements in 2018 backstopping the overall identity controversy with geographical and historical qualifications.[iv]

The UN on the contrary has failed to make any progress in Cyprus since 2017 and in reaction alternative backstop proposals are currently on the table:

• In 2024, the joint declaration of Cyprus Peace and Dialogue Center (CPDC) and Determination for Peace (Απόφαση Ειρήνης), facilitated by Meltem Onurkan-Samani, included a shared recommendation by former political figures across the divide that future referendums should not include the continuation of the status-quo among possible outcomes. Part of the rationale of this joint bicommunal initiative was to offer a way out of the all or nothing big bang approaches proven so far elusive and counter-productive.
• A more detailed proposal is that of the former Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator Ozdil Nami who has suggested a “clear timetable”, and that if no conclusion is reached within the agreed time, “Turkish Cypriots could be given the choice between federation and isolation, and Greek Cypriots could be given the choice between federation and a two-state solution”.[v] This proposal assumed referendums to be the final catalyst/ determining point for a backstop.
• Erol Kaymak extended this approach to suggest predetermined backstops if progress stalled at any phase not just at the time of referendum voting.[vi] Kaymak’s proposal suggests that these predetermined backstops should be structured around verifiable milestones tied to tangible advancements in negotiations; if one side is found to be obstructing progress, consequences such as the phased integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the EU could take effect as an alternative to a comprehensive agreement. This framework aligns with a broader shift toward a results-oriented approach. Instead, the proposed phased strategy incentivizes gradual commitments, while acknowledging the strategic realities of EU-Turkey relations to sustain the process.
• A related version backstop idea proposed Constantine Partasides KC is to use international arbitration that will involve “backstop” changes to the status quo if talks fail.[vii] A neutral arbitral tribunal (e.g. led by a senior diplomat of a neutral country) can be charged with determining responsibility for the breakdown, with the consequence that the other side’s backstop position is adopted (e.g. Varosha for the Greek Cypriots and limited attributes of autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots). Partasides also introduced a security backstop in the Cyprus talks addressing the outstanding issues of security and implementation (see below). [viii]
• Finally, a variation of the backstop proposal by Neophytos Loizides focuses on securing significant early wins for all sides[ix] at the start of the talks. Similar to the Partasides’ proposal, an ad hoc tribunal (e.g. led by a senior diplomat of a neutral country) could guarantee both the return of Varosha and limited international autonomy for TCs. This way both sides will start the talks with a ‘significant win’ consistent in the case of Varosha with the High-Level agreements and previous proposals for confidence building measures (CBMs). If parties fail to agree on the details, the ad hoc tribunal will decide how Varosha and autonomy will be regulated for instance on the basis of goodwill each side demonstrates in the comprehensive talks thus incentivizing reaching an overall agreement.

The purpose of highlighting these proposals is to demonstrate their merits (specific content could be further negotiated) and range of possible alternatives. Backstops do not necessarily need to focus on process design only. In fact, backstops could also encourage implementation across a range of issues. Examples include:

• Compensations backstops: owners and users could be guaranteed a minimum compensation in advance (proportional to their pre-1974 properties) if negatively affected by negotiated criteria. Interestingly, our research has shown that this will contribute to double majorities on both sides of the divide in a referendum.[x]
• Human rights backstops: vulnerable groups, returnees and third communities being guarantee rights and mechanisms to address their concerns during the implementation process. ECHR already acts as backstop on human rights violations but domestic remedies could be introduced in advance as proactive mechanisms.
• Demographic backstops: Mechanisms that will kick in if the Turkish Cypriot community faces a situation that is deemed unfair in terms of its majority status in its constituent state.

A security and implementation backstop is another important idea which transforms a high-risk game into a mutually-enforcing cooperative interaction. As a proactive implementation mechanism, a security backstop will determine for instance the final number of foreign troops considering factors such as the degree to which each side meets its pre-agreed commitments. This approach implies that remaining issues left in Crans Montana (sunset vs. review of troops) are not as contentious as they might seem. In fact, leaving those to a future arbitration (when security needs are better known is a reasonable arrangement) while linking final decisions to be made once each side has implemented its current commitment. This backstop arrangement covers both security and implementation fears at the same time; it implies that the party that implements the agreement best will have its security preferences prioritized by the tribunal while the party that fails to do so will have its legal entitlements reduced.[xi]

As in the case of Northern Ireland, academic research has shown that such security backstops will effectively contribute to winning double majorities in a future twin referendum in Cyprus.[xii] Backstops could also be the answer to difficult questions beyond Cyprus such as ‘Can we trust Putin or how to support Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa?’ Backstopping a risky agreement could serve as an insurance against the worst case fears of each side. Providing insurances against each party’s fears of non-implementation could transform even the most sceptical of minds in difficult or high risk negotiations (one might recall Tom Hanks ‘nice speech’ as James Britt Donovan in the Bridge of Spies.)[xiii] Backstop is the new promising term in conflict resolution. Backstops carry promise and potential across international negotiations and in Cyprus they appear to be an essential next step in moving forwards.

 

Further Reading

Cyprus Peace and Dialogue Centre (CPDC) and Determination for Peace (Apofasi Irinis) Joint Declaration Apr 9, 2024. (available at https://www.cypdc.org/post/cpdc-and-determination-for-peace-apofasi-irinis-joint-declaration)

Erol Kaymak Reviving Peace Talks in Cyprus: Diplo­matic Innovation and the New UN Envoy Creative Diplomacy Needed for Breakthrough in Long-Standing Conflict

SWP Comment 2024/C 07, 27.02.2024, 8 Seiten Doi:10.18449/2024C07 available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C07/

Loizides, Neophytos, Charis Psaltis, Edward Morgan-Jones, Laura Sudulich, Raluca Popp, and Tekin Baykiz. “Citizens and peace mediations in divided societies: identifying zones of agreement through a conjoint survey experiment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 9 (2022): 1619-1649 (available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00220027221108221

Morgan-Jones, Edward, Laura Sudulich, Feargal Cochrane, and Neophytos Loizides. “Citizen preferences about border arrangements in divided societies: evidence from a conjoint experiment in Northern Ireland.” Research & Politics 7, no. 3 (2020): 2053168020929927. (available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168020929927)

 

References

[i] Morgan-Jones, Edward, Laura Sudulich, Feargal Cochrane, and Neophytos Loizides. “Citizen preferences about border arrangements in divided societies: evidence from a conjoint experiment in Northern Ireland.” Research & Politics 7, no. 3 (2020): 2053168020929927.

[ii] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/cyprus-backstop-ireland-is-not-the-only-island-with-brexit-muddle-idUSKCN1R81FK/

[iii] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uks-starmer-says-only-us-backstop-can-secure-lasting-ukraine-peace-2025-02-26/

[iv] Nimetz, Matthew. “The Macedonian “name” dispute: the Macedonian Question—resolved?.” Nationalities Papers 48.2 (2020): 205-214.

[v] https://cyprus-mail.com/2025/01/08/cyprus-problem-could-be-solved-in-three-months

[vi] https://www.cypdc.org/post/cpdc-and-determination-for-peace-apofasi-irinis-joint-declaration & https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C07/

[vii]  Constantine Partasides is one of the world’s leading commercial arbitration lawyers. He  delivered a keynote address at the PEACERETURN conference last May in Nicosia addressing the merits of international arbitration mechanisms for the Cyprus peace talks available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3_Dn264fSU; see also interview to Stavros Antoniou in Politis 26/05/2024 available at https://politis.com.cy/politis-news/politiki/791831/i-diethnis-diaitisia-os-michanismos-epilysis-diaforon-sto-kypriako-i-protasi-toy-nomikoy-konstantinoy-partasidi?fbclid=IwY2xjawJBU6VleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHdU0QfVPWDLG7vbfHIrYuBmKy7LnfrEYzBfbci9yseNnknKcoeGkGnFlbg_aem_MNJJrwibaG1z_XJGV3X1_g

[viii] Constantine Partasides, Cyprus Concept Paper No.2 Troop Withdrawal-Review vs. Sunset, August 2024

[ix] Neophytos Loizides, ‘The Cyprus Peace Talks: Creative Solutions’ Presentation at the Rotary/George Mason Cyprus Meeting, November 17

[x] Loizides, Neophytos, Charis Psaltis, Edward Morgan-Jones, Laura Sudulich, Raluca Popp, and Tekin Baykiz. “Citizens and peace mediations in divided societies: identifying zones of agreement through a conjoint survey experiment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 9 (2022): 1619-1649.

[xi] Constantine Partasides, Cyprus Concept Paper No.2 Troop Withdrawal-Review vs. Sunset, August 2024. While it incentivises cooperation, it also leaves some issues that are difficult to resolve now to the decisions of neutral peaceful deliberation (assuming that no side will risk losing a future tribunal decision which might include its existing legal entitlements). See also

[xii] Loizides, Neophytos, Charis Psaltis, Edward Morgan-Jones, Laura Sudulich, Raluca Popp, and Tekin Baykiz. “Citizens and peace mediations in divided societies: identifying zones of agreement through a conjoint survey experiment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 9 (2022): 1619-1649.

[xiii] Bridge of Spies Nice Speech https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNhA_qSYfas