Assessing Decentralization in Egypt – Oscillations between centralisation and hopes for reform

Abstract

Egypt is known as a state defined by its highly centralised model of governance. This paper explores the role of decentralization within this framework, examining both historical and contemporary approaches to power-sharing. The paper highlights certain examples, such as the United Arab Republic, a brief period of integration with Syria whose failure deepened suspicions about decentralisation. However, the government’s resistance to any substantial power-sharing led to growing citizen discontent over time, culminating in the 2011 uprising. Actors in the revolution emphasised the need for reform and decentralisation, reigniting the debate on the implementation of decentralized structures. This study examines specific factors that have hindered these changes. In the final section, the paper identifies necessary reforms within the state, drawing on examples from scholars in the field. While decentralization is not presented as a panacea, its principles offer valuable insights that could help mitigate Egypt’s evolving political landscape.

Introduction

Egypt’s government structure has historically been defined by a deep-rooted tradition of centralized governance, a reality that is unmistakably reflected in the evolution of its constitutional framework over the past century. This longstanding centralization, allegedly designed to maintain national unity and ensure state stability, has been the cornerstone of Egypt’s administrative and political institutions. Despite persuasive arguments made by scholars that centralization and power-sharing are important tools for achieving development, aligning policies more closely with local needs and thereby reducing geographical inequality[1], such ideas have found limited resonance in the Egyptian context. The prevailing political culture, which prioritizes a strong, centralized authority, is sceptical of decentralization, fearing that dispersing power might lead to fragmentation and compromise the state’s ability to respond to political and security challenges. This essay aims to provide a brief overview of Egypt’s government structure, then moves over to examine post-revolutionary debates on power-sharing and finishes on an analysis of contemporary reform needs as well as demands for more localized governance.

 

Historical Perspectives

In order to delve deeper into understanding the underlying structure of the Egyptian government, a look into the 1923 constitution can be enlightening. This first text served as the model for all following constitutions. It established a constitutional monarchy with the king as the head of executive power. While enshrining many personal freedoms and liberties, it failed to empower the civil population. The same model has been enforced by subsequent political developments. One illustrative example, often misconceived as Egypt taking a step towards regional integration, is the formation of the United Arab Republic with Syria in 1958 under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The pan-Arab aspirations of then-President Nasser should not be conflated with efforts to create equal and interdependent states. Rather, as Syrian parties at the time were largely in favour of concluding an agreement with Egypt, hoping it could “serve as a nucleus for all-embracing Arab unity[2]”, Nasser’s interests were more set on fortifying Egyptian power. He imposed radical conditions such as the dissolution of all Syrian parties[3], a plebiscite and the withdrawal of the army from politics. Although the latter were at first accepted, Syrians felt over time that they were relegated to second class positions within the unified government, as many prominent positions were filled by Egyptians. Syrian officers further criticized that they were by-passed in the decision-making process. A research paper dedicated to the assessment of the reasons for the UAR’s failure states that “centralization was indeed excessive[4]”.

Although the undertaking to move towards unity failed because of an obvious lack of power-sharing, the Egyptian authorities did not reflect that part of history critically. The conclusion that working together with the Syrian authorities might have been mutually beneficial was, unfortunately, never reached.

 

The 2011 Revolution: Hopes for Systemic Change

Since very little, if anything, was learned from the UAR experiment, it does not come as a surprise that even the mere discourse on reforms to alter the centralized structure of Egypt was quasi non-existent up until the popular revolution of 2011. After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces suspended the (frequently amended) 1971 Constitution, and announced the establishment of a committee charged to prepare a report aimed at reviewing certain articles of the text. This point in time has been reflected in the work of Egyptian-British writer Alaa Abd El-Fattah, who gives valuable insights into the hopes this decision initially fuelled. However, this sentiment quickly vanished as the process, whose timeframe was foreseen to take six months, did not materialize as expected. It took over a year for anything to happen because stakeholders could not agree on the committee’s composition.[5] This occurrence, while failing to reach its goal in many dimensions, clearly shows the existence of actors in favour of a more decentralized structure. Political activists, intellectuals, lawyers and even a number of religious fractions demanded that the government becomes more responsive towards local needs during the uprisings. Despite those efforts, the conservative elements of the central state apparatus, the prevalence of the military and political elites hindered any kind of evolution. The constitutional drafting process that followed the revolution, particularly in 2012 and later in 2014, reflected these tensions. The 2012 Constitution, passed under the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, promised a greater degree of decentralization on paper, particularly in Article 187, which granted local councils increased powers[6]. However, these provisions were never implemented in practice, as political instability and clashes between the Brotherhood and the military-dominated establishment stalled any meaningful structural changes[7]. By the time the 2014 Constitution was drafted under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, many of these decentralization provisions had been watered down or rendered ineffective. While the new text once again acknowledged the need for local governance structures, the continued dominance of the security apparatus and military rule left little room for substantive reforms[8].

 

Reform Needs

Although several reform needs have been voiced during the revolution, they remain largely unaddressed. A thus far unchanged, but nonetheless critical issue is the absence of a clear constitutional framework granting local governments real authority. While the 2014 Constitution nominally allows for some decentralization, it lacks binding mechanisms to ensure regional autonomy[9]. Calls for reform have come from figures like lawyer Mohamed El Baradei and organizations such as the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), which advocate for directly electing local officials instead of presidential appointments[10]. Fiscal decentralization is another realm that is in dire need of reform. Local governments remain financially dependent on the central state, limiting their ability to govern effectively[11]. Even the World Bank has emphasized the necessity of revenue-sharing reforms that grant local authorities the power to generate funds through taxation and municipal fees[12]. Institutional capacity building is equally crucial, as local administrative bodies often lack the necessary expertise and infrastructure to function independently. Scholars like Dina El-Khawaga argue that decentralization can only succeed if governance institutions are strengthened[13]. Public participation is also severely lacking, as decision-making remains a top-down process. Activists involved in the 2011 revolution, including members of the Kefaya (Arabic: Enough) movement, demanded mechanisms such as participatory budgeting and stronger local councils, but these proposals were largely ignored[14]. Finally, decentralization reforms must address regional inequalities. Cairo continues to dominate political and economic power, while historically marginalized areas like Upper Egypt and Sinai remain underdeveloped[15]. Development experts from the Carnegie Middle East Center suggest an asymmetrical federalism model, where different regions receive tailored levels of autonomy based on their economic and political circumstances[16]. Despite persistent advocacy from international organizations, academics, and Egyptian activists, these reforms face strong resistance from entrenched political elites and the military.

 

Conclusion

From a pragmatic perspective, the likelihood of Egypt to implement a more decentralized system under the present circumstances is very low. Some cultural and historical factors, such as the longstanding centralization of power and the military’s role in governance, continue to hinder this development. However, as discussions in recent years clearly underline, there is a social and academic awareness for the need to decentralize.

According to the Corruption Perception Index of 2024 published by Transparency International, Egypt fell by 5 places and is ranked as 130 out of 180 countries[17].

Persistent governance inefficiencies and the lack of institutional transparency further complicate efforts to implement meaningful decentralization. While various political activists and civil society groups continue to push for reform, resistance from the central government remains a significant obstacle. Although notable evolutions remain improbable in the near future, ongoing demands for decentralization indicate that the debate is far from over.

 

[1] Hadi Shantir, Mohamed Abdel. Decentralization and Geographical Inequality. In: Egypt DECENTRALIZATION and GEOGRAPHICAL INEQUALITY in EGYPT EGYPT POLICY DIALOGUES. Apr. 2022.

[2] Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958) p. 19.

[3] Michel Aflaq, Ma’rakat El-Maskr El-Wahid (Struggles of the Common Destiny) Damascus: Daral-Adab, 1963, p. 193-201.

[4] Palmer, Monte. “The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its Failure.” Source: Middle East Journal, vol. 20, no. 1, 1966, p. 56.

[5] Alaa Abd El-Fattah, Naomi Klein. You Have Not Yet Been Defeated Selected Writings 2011-2019. London Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2021.

[6] AbuKhalil, As’ad. “Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government. By Nathan J. Brown. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. p. 244. American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 842–843. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402670467.

[7] El-Ghobashy, Mona. “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 2013, pp. 373-395.

[8] Roll, Stephan. “Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Economic Reform.” SWP Research Paper, 2016.

[9] Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. Oxford University Press, 2015.

[10] “Egypt’s Political Future: Local and Regional Governance.” Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), 2015.

[11] Roll, Stephan. Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak: A Powerful Player between Generals and Brotherhood. SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2013.

[12] See: World Bank. “Local Governance in Egypt: Challenges and Opportunities.” World Bank Report, 2017.

[13] El-Khawaga, Dina. “Decentralization and Governance in Egypt.” Arab Reform Initiative, 2008.

[14] Shehata, Samer. Islamists and the State: Legitimacy and Institutions in Egypt and the Arab World. Stanford University Press, 2009.

[15] Hadi Shantir, Mohamed Abdel. Decentralization and Geographical Inequality in Egypt DECENTRALIZATION and GEOGRAPHICAL INEQUALITY in EGYPT EGYPT POLICY DIALOGUES in Partnership With. Apr. 2022.

[16] Sayigh, Yezid. “Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy.” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019.

[17] Transparency International. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2024. 2025.

 

References and Further Reading

Hadi Shantir, Mohamed Abdel. Decentralization and Geographical Inequality. In: Egypt DECENTRALIZATION and GEOGRAPHICAL INEQUALITY in EGYPT EGYPT POLICY DIALOGUES. Apr. 2022.

Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958) p. 19.

Michel Aflaq, Ma’rakat El-Maskr El-Wahid (Struggles of the Common Destiny) Damascus: Daral-Adab, 1963, p. 193-201.

Palmer, Monte. “The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its Failure.” Source: Middle East Journal, vol. 20, no. 1, 1966, p. 56.

Alaa Abd El-Fattah, Naomi Klein. You Have Not Yet Been Defeated Selected Writings 2011-2019. London Fitzcarraldo Editions, 2021.

AbuKhalil, As’ad. “Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government. By Nathan J. Brown. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. p. 244. American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 842–843. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402670467.

El-Ghobashy, Mona. “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 2013, pp. 373-395.

Roll, Stephan. “Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Economic Reform.” SWP Research Paper, 2016.

Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. Oxford University Press, 2015.

“Egypt’s Political Future: Local and Regional Governance.” Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), 2015.

Roll, Stephan. Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak: A Powerful Player between Generals and Brotherhood. SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2013.

World Bank. “Local Governance in Egypt: Challenges and Opportunities.” World Bank Report, 2017.

Shehata, Samer. Islamists and the State: Legitimacy and Institutions in Egypt and the Arab World. Stanford University Press, 2009.

Sayigh, Yezid. “Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy.” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019.

Transparency International. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2024. 2025