Aleksandr Shobonov is a first-year doctoral candidate at RWTH Aachen University, Germany, working on the interdisciplinary project "Federalism, (De-)centralization and (De-)democratization in Russia: Comparative Lessons for Future Institutional Design", which bridges political science, constitutional law, and history. He holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Political Science from Lomonosov Moscow State University, and is also pursuing a second Master's in Public Law at Briva University, founded by Russian professors in exile.
Aleksandr gained professional experience at the Football Union of Russia as a Strategic Communications and Regional Development Manager, where direct interaction with federal and regional authorities shaped my initial understanding of intergovernmental relations and my perception of federal arrangements in specific institutional contexts. Later, he spent almost a year in a federal government agency that oversees media, communications and the Internet.
Abstract
Russia’s contemporary political trajectory is characterised by the consolidation of an authoritarian regime and a persistent concentration of power, reinforced through successive crises, including the ongoing war against Ukraine. These developments have been accompanied by large-scale human losses, widespread political repression, and the systematic weakening of constitutional safeguards, resulting in highly centralised governance structures. Against this background, urgent questions arise about how state institutions should be designed in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, particularly in balancing the risks of excessive centralisation and destabilising fragmentation. This contribution approaches federalism not as a static institutional arrangement, but as a dynamic process interacting with broader patterns of (de-)centralisation and (de-)democratisation. It seeks to develop a conceptual and methodological framework for analysing these processes across major historical periods of Russian state development, complemented by a comparative dimension. Rather than presenting a fully developed framework or definitive findings, the study identifies key conceptual questions and analytical directions that guide an ongoing doctoral research agenda. Ultimately, the project aims to contribute to understanding how federal arrangements can support democratic resilience in post-authoritarian contexts.
Introduction
In 2026, the Russian state in its current form marks 35 years of existence. Within this relatively short period, the country has experienced a continuous sequence of crises, including the 1993 constitutional crisis, the Chechen wars (1994-1996, 1999-2009), the 2008 war with Georgia, and the aggression against Ukraine, culminating in a full-scale invasion in 2022. Today the Russian state represents not only a major security threat in Europe (see e.g. Federal Government, 2023; SGDSN, 2025), but also an internal threat, being a source of large-scale human losses (Mediazona, 2026) and massive political repression (see e.g. OVD-Info, 2026). These crises were either organised by federal authorities or were direct consequences of their actions.
Each successive crisis reinforced presidential power, becoming the primary, if not the only meaningful source of legitimacy for other branches and levels of government (Klimovich, 2023). This consolidation of power was accompanied by the restriction of democratic rights and freedoms (see e.g. Isayeva and Others v. Russia, 2005; Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, 2013; Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, 2017). According to V-Dem indices, the reversal of newly emerging democratic practices began as early as 1993. Since 2000, Russia has steadily moved toward authoritarianism, and the Democracy Index has classified it as such every year since 2011. However, this trajectory may seem particularly striking at first glance, given the formally complex constitutional design, including a semi-presidential system and a federal structure.
Centralised Authoritarian State and the Failure of Constitutional Safeguards
Although the 1993 Constitution formally enshrined democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and the prioritization of citizens’ rights and freedoms, institutional safeguards that should have contributed to the implementation and protection of constitutional values proved weak, failing sequentially under a strongly presidential-dominant system (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013; Mishina, 2023). The Constitutional Court, being dependent on the presidency, consistently confirmed the validity of legal measures that strengthened the presidency and federal power, and subordinated human rights to state interests (Mishina, 2023; Lukyanova et al., 2024).
As a result, by 2026 Russia exhibits a highly centralised dominant-party system, with hegemonic “United Russia” controlling all levels of government (Klimovich and Kropp, 2022). Political competition is constrained by constant manipulations of electoral and party laws in favour of the president and the dominant party (Kynev, 2024; Lukyanova et al., 2024), as well as by strong presidential oversight of courts and law enforcement agencies (Mishina, 2023).
Regional autonomy is also considerably limited, and federal arrangements operate largely as formal structures. The second chamber has de facto lost its original meaning due to appointment procedures, electoral manipulations and one-party dominance. Federal districts, a para-constitutional level of government, function as de facto “general-governors” installed by the national government, influencing internal sub-national decision-making and personnel appointments (Klimovich and Kropp, 2022; Kynev, 2024). Regional authorities operate under detailed federal legislation that often goes beyond “framework laws”, in a context of fiscal centralisation and opaque resource distribution (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013; Lukyanova et al., 2024). Scholars have repeatedly characterised Russia as “a federation without federalism” (Ross, 2002), one of the most highly centralised federations (Watts, 2008), and “constitutionally federal but not operationally federal” (Kincaid, 2019). Despite – or rather perhaps because of these dynamics – Russia remains an important case for analysis.
Research Focus and Institutional Design Challenges
These developments raise two closely connected questions. First, how can political power be transformed in a system where democratic mechanisms of change are blocked? Second, how should state institutions be designed after the fall of authoritarian rule? The experience of the early 1990s demonstrates that the absence of analytically grounded reform strategies during critical junctures may lead to unstable and reversible institutional outcomes. This makes the question of institutional design particularly salient in the Russian context.
There are no universally optimal institutional designs; their effectiveness depends on specific societal conditions, historical trajectories and purposes. Identifying such context-sensitive arrangements is a core task for research on democratic transitions. Given the persistent concentration of power as a defining feature of Russia’s political development, my research focuses on federalism as a mechanism for constraining excessive centralisation and supporting resilient democratic order. It also addresses the role of federal arrangements in preventing destabilising fragmentation and defining the boundaries of sustainable autonomy-cohesion balances.
Conceptual Approach and Research Direction
Federalism is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that forms part of the broader system of vertical power-sharing. Existing scholarship demonstrates that federal arrangements may strengthen democratic governance, weaken it (Benz and Sonnicksen, 2017; Sonnicksen, 2018), or coexist with authoritarian rule (Obydenkova and Swenden, 2013; Kropp and Keil, 2022), depending on the context and specific institutional design. Importantly, institutions evolve over time, while their trajectories remain shaped by path dependence and critical junctures (Benz and Broschek, 2013; Benz and Sonnicksen, 2017; Mishina, 2020).
One of the key conceptual challenges concerns the relationship between (de-)democratisation and (de-)federalisation in Russia. How have these processes interacted over time, and which institutional choices have shaped their trajectories? Historically, Russia has been characterised by highly centralised governance, in which territories were often treated primarily as administrative units or sources of resource extraction rather than as self-governing entities (see e.g. Pravilova, 2006; Etkind, 2011). Although periods of decentralisation and attempts at democratisation have occurred, these efforts have repeatedly been constrained or reversed by centralising elites (Hirsch, 2005; Mishina, 2020; Lukyanova et al., 2024).
This recurring pattern raises questions about the adequacy of the application of widely used concepts such as “democratic backsliding” and “defederalisation” to the Russian case. In a context where democratic and federal institutions were only partially consolidated, these terms may obscure rather than clarify long-term trajectories. Rather than indicating a clear reversal, recent developments may reflect the continuation – or reassertion – of historically entrenched patterns of centralisation and authoritarian governance. From this perspective, processes often described as “defederalisation” may instead reflect forms of re-unitarisation, while developments labelled as “democratic backsliding” may be better understood as re-authoritarianisation. These ambiguities highlight the need for a precise analytical framework.
Another conceptual challenge lies in distinguishing between (de-)federalisation and (de-)centralisation. While closely related, these processes are not interchangeable, and their interaction remains insufficiently explored in the literature. This raises a more fundamental question: under what conditions, and at what point, can a given degree of (de-)centralisation be interpreted as (de-)federalisation – if at all? This distinction is particularly relevant for the Russian case – where, despite formal constitutional changes across historical periods, the boundary between federal and non-federal arrangements remains empirically blurred. Addressing this question requires attention not only to formal institutional structures, but also to informal practices and power relations that may reshape or undermine formally federal structures.
To address these issues, my research approaches federalism and democracy as interacting processes of (de-)federalisation, (de-)centralisation, and (de-)democratisation. The aim is to develop a conceptual and methodological framework that captures these dynamics and their interrelations.
Empirically, the goal is to trace these processes across three major historical periods of Russian state development – from the reforms of the 1860s to 2021. By examining institutional development and reform initiatives in the late Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and modern Russia, the study seeks to identify conditions under which arrangements associated with (de-)federalisation processes have evolved in ways that either constrain or reinforce centralised power. It also aims to explore historical patterns and institutional traditions that could inform and constrain feasible options for future institutional engineering.
Building on the Russian case, the research will adopt a comparative perspective. A set of countries will be selected based on criteria derived from several research strands, particularly comparative federalism, allowing to identify institutional configurations and mechanisms through which federal arrangements interact with broader political regimes. This comparative approach will show how institutional configurations influence the robustness of democracy, informing analytically grounded recommendations for future reforms in Russia.
Contemporary Relevance
The Russian experience has immediate significance for understanding how federal institutions may constrain excessive centralisation and contribute to democratic resilience in post-authoritarian contexts. In the current context of the ongoing war, domestic human losses and widespread violations of rights and freedoms, these questions acquire urgency.
At its current stage, my research raises more questions than it provides definitive answers. However, developing a coherent analytical framework to address these questions is a necessary step toward better understanding the relationship between federalism, the extent of (de-)centralisation, and (non-)democratic trajectories in Russia and other comparator countries. Ultimately, my research aims to inform debates on institutional design in post-authoritarian states and contribute to the broader understanding of how federal arrangements can foster durable democratic governance.
Bibliography
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia (2013) Nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, European Court of Human Rights, 4 July 2013.
Benz, A., Broschek, J. (eds.) (2013) Federal Dynamics. Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benz, A., Sonnicksen, J. (2017) Patterns of Federal Democracy: Tensions, Friction, or Balance Between Two Government Dimensions. European Political Science Review, 9(1), pp. 3-25.
Etkind, A. (2011) Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience. Polity: Cambridge.
Federal Government (2023) Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany: National Security Strategy. Berlin: Federal Government.
Hirsch, Fr. (2005) Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union. New York: Cornell University Press.
Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005). App. nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, European Court of Human Rights, 24 February 2005.
Kincaid, J. (2019) Introduction: A Research Agenda for Federalism Studies. In John Kincaid (ed.), A Research Agenda for Federalism Studies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 1-14.
Klimovich, S., Kropp, S. (2022) Federal Regression and the Authoritarian Turn in Russia. In: Keil, S., Kropp, S. (eds) Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 73-94.
Klimovich, S. (2023) Mind the Gap between the Governor and the People: The Common Agency Problem in Russian Authoritarian Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 53(2), pp. 301-324.
Kropp, S., Keil, S. (2022) The Emergence and Regression of Federal Structures: Theoretical Lenses and Analytical Dimensions. In: Keil, S., Kropp, S. (eds) Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3-30.
Kynev, A. (2024) Kto i kak upravlyaet regionami Rossii: Sistema upravleniya i administrativnaya ustoychivost’ vlasti regional’nykh subyektov [Who Governs the Regions of Russia: The System of Governance and Administrative stability of Regional Power in Russia]. Moscow: Ruteniya Publisher.
Lashmankin and Others v. Russia (2017). App. nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, European Court of Human Rights, 7 February 2017.
Lukyanova, E., Poroshin, E., Arutyunov, A., Shpilkin, S., Zvorykina, E. (2024) Maximum Security Elections: How Did Elections in Russia Turn Into Non-Elections and What is to Be Done About It? A Political-Legal Investigation with Elements of Mathematics. Riga: Brīvās Universitātes izdevniecība. Available at https://freeuniversity.press/books/mse/.
Mediazona (2026) Russian losses in the war with Ukraine. Mediazona count, updated. Available at: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng (Accessed: 26 March 2026).
Mishina, E. (2020) The Long Shadows of The Soviet Past: A Picture Of Judicial Reforms in The Transition Era. Moscow: Liberal Mission Foundation.
Mishina, E. (2023) Rossiiskaya Konstitutsiya 1993 g.: iz’yani iznachal’nogo dizaina, popravki I konstitutsionnaya kontrreforma 2020 g. [The Russian Constitution of 1993: Defects of the Original Design, Amendments and the Constitutional Counter-Reform of 2020]. Palladium, Free University Journal, pp. 187-203.
Obydenkova, A., Swenden, W. (2013) Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe. Territory, Politics, Governance, 1(1), pp. 86–112.
OVD-Info (2026) Repression in Russia in 2025. Overview by OVD-Info. Available at: https://reports.ovd.info/en/repression-russia-2025-overview-ovd-info#1 (Accessed: 28 March 2026).
Pravilova, E. (2006) Finansi imperii: Den’gi i vlast’ v politike Rossii na natsional’nikh okrainakh, 1801-1917 [The Finances of Empire: Money and Power in Russian Policy in the Imperial Borderlands, 1801–1917]. Moscow: Novoye Izdatel’stvo [New Publisher].
Ross, C. (2002) Federalism and Democratization in Russia. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (2025). Revue nationale stratégique 2025. Paris: SGDSN.
Sonnicksen, J. (2018) Federalism and Democracy. A Tense Relationship. In Tudelo Aranda, J., Kölling, M., Reverigo Picón, F. (eds.) Calidad democrática y organización territorial. Madrid: Marcial Pons, Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales, pp. 31-52.
Watts, R. (2008) Comparing Federal Systems. 3rd edn. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Further Reading
Broschek, J. (2012) Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Federalism. World Political Science, 8(1), pp. 101-128.
Golosov, G. (2024) Politicheskiye rezhimy i transformatsii: Rossiya v sravnitel’noy perspektive [Political Regimes and Transformations: Russia in Comparative Perspective]. Moscow: Ruthenia Publisher. (in Russian)
Krasnov, M., Shablinski, I. (2008) Rossiiskaya systema vlasti: treugol’nik s odnim uglom [Russian System of Power: a Triangle with One Corner]. Moscow: Institute for Law and Public Policy. (in Russian)
Popelier, P. (2021) Dynamic Federalism: A New Theory for Cohesion and Regional Autonomy. London: Routledge.