Abstract
Americans revere the United States Constitution and the Founders who created it, so they rarely amend the Constitution, and they rely on the United States Supreme Court to elaborate its meaning. But they have a very different relationship to their state constitutions. They regularly amend their state constitutions or replace them altogether, and they have no compunction about jettisoning what the constitutions’ founders created. When they disagree with how a state court interprets the state constitution, they adopt amendments to overrule the judges or even vote them out of office. This dual constitutionalism encourages a distinctive political practice. Americans treat the U.S. Constitution as a repository of political principles, but they view their state constitutions as a species of ordinary law and use them rather than revere them, including in them provisions that could as easily be put in statutes. This facilitates popular control over government. The result is a system of dual constitutionalism that combines stability at the national level with dynamism at the state level, statements of fundamental principle at the national level with the vigor of popular input at the state level.