Second Chamber

Ethiopia’s ‘Unusual Constitutional Umpire’: Revisiting the Role of the House of Federation

Ethiopia’s ‘Unusual Constitutional Umpire’: Revisiting the Role of the House of Federation

Abstract

Ethiopia has an ‘unusual’ system of constitutional umpire in which a political organ – the House of Federation, the upper of House of the Parliament – is charged with resolving constitutional disputes. In the past there were debates on the appropriateness of the country’s constitutional umpire. Cases were made both for and against it.  However, the entire political space being controlled by a single political party – the EPRDF – there were no major intergovernmental constitutional disputes that put the system of constitutional adjudication to a serious test. With EPRDF no more and the country’s political scene unrecognisably transformed, it has now become clear that the Ethiopian system of constitutional umpire is not only unusual but also deeply flawed and that it needs to be reformed.

 

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Posted by Zemelak Ayitenew Ayele in Case Studies, 0 comments
Second Chambers In Federal States

Second Chambers In Federal States

Abstract

Second chambers have a long history and were re-designed for the purposes of federalism with the invention of the US Senate. Today, almost all federal parliaments have a bicameral structure in order to allow the constituent units to exercise shared rule. The composition and selection of federal second chambers varies very much, though: the constituent units are either represented equally or by different numbers of delegates, who are, in most cases, either appointed or elected directly or indirectly. The core function of federal second chambers relates to legislation, even though not all of them are responsible for a full range of legislative matters or other legislative functions than just (suspensive or absolute) veto powers; in some cases, they also exercise non-legislative functions. Many federal second chambers are criticized for their political inefficiency and non-representation of constituent interests. It is doubtful, however, whether they could be replaced by an alternative mechanism.

 

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Posted by Anna Gamper in Theory, 0 comments