Federalism and Ethnic Accommodation in Ethiopia: A Promised Solution or a Persistent Dilemma?

Abstract

Ethiopia adopted multinational federalism in 1995 to accommodate its diverse ethnic groups, granting them self-determination rights, including secession. While this system has enhanced linguistic and cultural recognition, and improved ethnic representation and self-rule, it has also inadvertently deepened ethnic divisions, contributing to recurrent conflicts and instability. The federal framework, intended as a solution to historical marginalization, appears to have reinforced inter-ethnic competition. This article examines Ethiopia’s federalism, its achievements, shortcomings, and ongoing challenges, arguing that meaningful reforms, such as electoral reform, institutional strengthening, and genuine conflict resolution mechanisms, are crucial to achieving a more stable and inclusive political order.

Introduction

Ethiopia, once characterised as a highly centralised state and referred to as a “prison house of nationalities,” adopted multinational federalism in 1995 to accommodate its diverse ethnic groups. Its constitution grants every nation, nationality, and people the right to self-determination, including secession. Ethiopia’s federal system is primarily organised along ethnic lines. This approach aims to empower specific ethnic groups within subnational units, making Ethiopia a unique example of federalism. This article explores the reasons behind Ethiopia’s choice of this federal system, its strengths and weaknesses, and why it has not fully realised its promise of ethnic accommodation and stability.

 

Why Ethiopia adopted federalism

Ethiopia’s transition to federalism began with de facto federation in 1991 that later became de jure under the 1995 constitution championed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The primary factor that led to the transition to federalism is the historical centralisation and ethnic marginalisation that characterised Ethiopia’s past. Ethiopia was governed through a centralised system, first under imperial rule and later under the military regime known as the Derg (1974–1991). This centralisation is tied to the coercive Ethiopian state-building process, during which Menelik II extended his control over previously autonomous areas such as the present-day Oromia, Somali, and Sidama to create modern Ethiopia (Zewde 2001). Haile Selassie, who ruled Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, continued power consolidation by directly appointing governors to administer the regions conquered under Menelik’s expansion (Marcus 1994, 112–13).

When the Derg rose to power in 1974, following a revolution sparked by the Ethiopian Student Movement, it enforced even stricter centralised rule while offering only superficial acknowledgement of Ethiopia’s nations and nationalities (Clapham 1988; Zewde 2001). Despite coming to power under the Marxist-Leninist banner of national self-determination, the regime largely ignored these aspirations, responding to demands for self-rule with violence, which resulted in 17 years of civil war.

During pre-EPRDF, ethnic identities except Amhara, were politically and culturally marginalised (Young 1999, 192). Despite Ethiopia being home to about 80 nations and nationalities, including the largest nation Oromo, Amharic was offered a privileged position as a state language, while other Ethiopian languages were banned and discouraged (Abbay 2013, 237–38). Overall, the Ethiopian state-building project was based on Amhara’s identity, to the exclusion of other nations and nationalities. This led to extended resistance, instability and internal conflict. Several ethnic-based insurgent groups took up arms against the state and fought hard and long for autonomy and self-rule. This era culminated in the victory of the federalist forces led by the EPRDF in 1991.

EPRDF’s victory heralded a new era for Ethiopia, transforming the state from a ‘prison house of nationalities’ to a ‘state of nations’. Federalism became the preferred means of accommodation, and hence, the EPRDF reconfigured state power by institutionalising ethnic autonomy as a building block of territorial governance. Article 39 grants “nations, nationalities, and peoples” the right to self-determination, up to secession (FDRE Constitution 1995). This was seen as a way to recognise historical grievances, accommodate diversity, and prevent ethnic domination by any single group (Fiseha 2012). Since 1995, ethnic self-determination has become an institutionalised primary means of political mobilisation.

 

Source: Wikimedia Commons (2025).  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Regions_of_Ethiopia_EN.svg#

 

Achievements of Ethiopian Federalism

Linguistic and Cultural Recognition

Ethiopian federalism has led to institutional recognition of diversity translated into greater linguistic autonomy, with several regions adopting their own official languages in their jurisdiction. More than 51 languages have become the languages of education at various levels compared to the previous eras where only Amharic was the medium of instruction (Yimenu 2022, 1628). This is a big achievement in itself as it allows multiple ethnic groups to use their language in schools and access public service.

Federalism also enabled the different ethnic groups to establish their own regions with full-fledged governments. Regions have their respective constitutions, working languages,  defined boundaries, flags, regional anthems, and regional police (Yimenu 2023). Regions are empowered to establish local governments. The Constitution also provides that all regions ‘shall have equal rights and powers’ (Art. 47). This has allowed ethnic groups in previously marginalised areas, such as Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali to exercise political agency (Aalen 2006). Numerically, small territorial ethnic groups in multiethnic regions are made to have subregional local government institutions and use their language in public spaces. The combined efforts of devolution have improved local administration and service delivery, particularly in health and education (Faguet et al. 2020, 81).

Another achievement of federalism is the increased ethnic representation in central government institutions. Compared to the previous era, where the ethnic Amhara disproportionately dominated central government, post-federalism Ethiopia has seen significant participation of diverse ethnic groups in shared rule institutions. Over time, elites from previously sidelined ethnic groups, such as the Somali and Afar, have held key positions, including the Ministry of Finance, the deputy presidency of the ruling party, and  the Minister of Defence (Yimenu 2024, 37). Moreover, each nation, nationality, and people are represented by at least one representative and one additional representative for each one million of its population in the House of Federation (HoF) (Art. 31 FDRE Constitution 1995). The HoF is Ethiopia’s second chamber, which is empowered over constitutional adjudication, grant determination, and issues of identity (FDRE Constitution 1995, Art. 62). Beyond its symbolic value, this increased representation contributes to a more inclusive political landscape, improves the sense of belonging among historically marginalised communities, and enables them to influence national policymaking.

 

Why Ethiopia’s federalism is imperfect

Despite achievements, Ethiopia’s federalism has inadvertently contributed to exacerbating existing problems and created new challenges. Detractors argue that the federal system exacerbated existing tensions and, hence, contributed to ethnic-based conflicts and displacements. The country has witnessed recurring ethnic violence, including frequent clashes in Benishangul-Gumuz (Kefale 2013), conflicts between the Oromo and Somali regions (BBC 2017), and Amhara and Tigray regions (BBC 2023).

One may raise a question of how federalism is blamed. One explanation is that the federal system has reinforced rigid identity divisions as regions are crafted following ethnic and linguistic lines. This left permanent ethnic fault lines which contributed to inter-ethnic competition for land, resources and power, contributing to a lack of inter-regional and inter-ethnic harmony. As ethnic identity became the primary political mobilisation and criterion of subnational state creation, a strong national integration mechanism is missing. The emphasis on ethnic identity has eroded pan-Ethiopian nationalism (Ishiyama 2021).

However, this claim warrants closer scrutiny. Notably, ethnonationalist parties advocating for greater autonomy or even secession, such as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), emerged well before the adoption of federalism. These groups were not products of federalism but rather key actors in the creation of Ethiopia’s federal structure. Their continued insurgency operation despite federalism suggests that their demands and grievances stem from deeper historical and political factors rather than being a byproduct of federalism itself. Rather than fuelling ethnonationalism, federalism could be seen as an attempt, albeit an imperfect one, to manage pre-existing ethno-nationalist movements within an institutional framework. Thus, the persistence of these groups may rather reflect federalism’s perceived inadequacies in fully addressing their aspirations.

While formally a federal state, Ethiopia has functioned under a dominant-party system. The EPRDF (1991–2019) and now the Prosperity Party have exerted centralised control, often suppressing genuine regional autonomy. Elections held regularly but only for regime legitimation  (Yimenu 2024). Though the constitution is generous in according a wide range of powers to regions, political practice is highly centralised (Mezgebe 2015). Federalism has been instrumentalized to consolidate power rather than to create a truly decentralised system.

Ethiopian federalism is unique in that it grants the right to self-determination, including secession (Art. 39, FDRE Constitution 1995). The constitutional right to secession, initially seen as a safeguard against ethnic marginalization, has been feared to facilitate the country’s dissolution by laying down a foundation for disintegration rather than unity. The fact that most regions are crafted based on ethnic identity and have agency means federalism has allowed political infrastructure and resources that could be mobilised by regions towards independence.

Despite its flaws, a majority of Ethiopians (54%) prefer a federal system over a unitary one (Afrobarometer 2023, 118). About two-thirds (67%) support keeping the current constitution with some amendments.  While 67% support keeping the current constitution with amendments, opinions on federalism are divided—48% favour maintaining the identity-based system, while 49.1% prefer shifting to a geography-based model (Afrobarometer 2023, 119). Another contentious issue is the constitutional right to self-determination, including secession, which is often debated for removal. Currently, 47.4% oppose its removal, while 45.6% support it (Afrobarometer 2023, 119). This marks a shift from 2019, when 50.2% opposed its removal and 42.7% supported it (Afrobarometer 2020, 82). Understanding why opposition to removing this provision has declined over the years requires further analysis.

 

Recent events and challenges to federalism

The past five years have highlighted Ethiopia’s federalism’s struggle to ensure stability. In November 2020, tensions between the federal government and the TPLF erupted into full-scale war. The TPLF, claiming regional autonomy was under threat and that it was marginalized in central government positions, directly challenged federal authority. The House of Federation, tasked with resolving intergovernmental disputes, failed to prevent the conflict. The war began when Tigray forces attacked a national defence camp, underscoring the risks of ethno-regional militarization under federalism.

The war also exposed the dangers of unresolved inter-ethnic and inter-regional territorial disputes. For decades, Amhara elites have argued that Western Tigray was annexed to the Tigray region during the TPLF-led federalization process (John 2021). After the Tigray war, Amhara regional forces seized the contested areas, displacing hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tigrayans (BBC 2023). While the constitution provides a clear procedure for resolving such disputes through a referendum (Articles 39 and 62, FDRE Constitution 1995) , this process was ignored in Western Tigray. Similar conflicts, such as those between Oromia and the Somali region or Oromia and the SNNP region, were settled through referendums. However, under the TPLF-dominated federal government, demands for a constitutional resolution were systematically suppressed for political gain until Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018. Despite the Pretoria Agreement signed in November 2022 to stop the Tigray war, the issue remains unresolved and highly contested, continuing to fuel tensions and instability.

Another recent challenge to Ethiopian federalism is the rise of Amhara nationalism, which has gained momentum since Abiy Ahmed came to power. Many Amhara nationalists argue that the federal system has diminished Amhara’s political influence and that the constitution has framed Amharas as historical oppressors, making them targets of ethnic-based violence (Tazebew 2021). During the Tigray war, Abiy allied with Amhara nationalist militias (Fano), but following the Pretoria Agreement, these militias turned against him. As a result, the Amhara region has faced growing instability, with ongoing conflict between government forces and Fano militias.

Ethiopian federalism has also struggled to balance granting autonomy to territorial ethnic groups while protecting the rights of non-territorial ethnic minorities. Most regions are ethnically defined, with regional constitutions designating certain groups as the rightful owners and others as “non-titular.” This framework has deepened ethnic divisions, often leading to tensions and the displacement of minorities who reside outside their designated home regions.

Another contentious issue is the implementation of the constitutional right to self-determination. Article 39(3) grants every nation and nationality the right to full self-government, yet only seven ethnic groups have established their own regions. Many others remain clustered together in multi-ethnic regions. While ethnic-local governments in regions like the SNNP allow some degree of self-rule, there are no clear criteria for determining which groups qualify for their own region and which do not, creating inconsistency and political tensions. Even in the House of Federation (HoF), ethnic representation remains inconsistent. While the 2007 national census identified 85 ethnonationalities (CSA 2007, 90–91),  only 77 were represented in the HoF during its fifth term (2015–2021) (Yimenu 2022, 1629). For many ethnic groups, self-rule remains an unfulfilled aspiration and a source of conflict, as such demands are often met with state repression. The Sidama nation, for example, faced decades of suppression before finally securing regional statehood through the 2019 referendum (Tronvoll 2021). This success has since inspired other groups, such as the Wolayta and Gurage, to push for their own regional status.

Since assuming power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed has sought to manipulate the demands by clustering groups together to create additional regions from the most diverse SNNP region, which is home to 55 ethnic groups. Allowing each ethnic group to form its own region is impractical, as some of them have only populations in the tens of thousands and lack the resources and capacity to establish and sustain regional administrations. If the constitution were fully respected, Ethiopia would have nearly 80 regions, one for each ethnic group. However, this is not feasible due to economic, political, and administrative challenges.

Even nations with their own regions feel that their constitutional rights have not been fully respected. A case in point is the Oromia region, where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) has been advocating for greater autonomy, including secession. Despite two rounds of peace talks between the federal government and the OLA in Tanzania, no resolution has been reached (Al Jazeera 2023). Although the Oromo is the largest nation in Ethiopia, it has faced historical marginalisation. It continues to demand that Afan Oromo, the Oromo language, be recognised as an additional working language of the federal government. A recent survey reveals that 66.6% of Ethiopians support the idea of adding languages other than Amharic as official working languages of the federal government (Afrobarometer 2023, 119).  Yet, this demand remains unaddressed despite Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, being in power for six years.

 

Conclusion: Towards a more balanced federalism?

Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism was initially designed to accommodate diversity and address ethnic grievances, but it has inadvertently deepened ethnic divisions and contributed to instability. Moving forward, reforms that promote cross-ethnic political alliances, strengthen national institutions, and encourage civic identity over purely ethnic identity are essential. In the short term, a shift from the current First Past The Post electoral system to a proportional representation system would allow ethnic parties to secure seats in the national parliament. This would go beyond symbolic representation, transforming the country’s three decades of de facto one-party legislative body. Further reforms should focus on clarifying the criteria for regional status, as the current approach is ambiguous and often driven by political pressure and intra-party negotiations rather than clear, consistent criteria. Institutions designed to resolve territorial disputes must be empowered and depoliticised, and resolving conflicts through negotiation should be genuinely embraced. Without these reforms, Ethiopia risks ongoing ethnic conflict and political fragility.

 

References and Further Reading

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———. 2023. ‘Ethiopia Plans Vote to Solve Tigray-Amhara Territory Dispute’. BBC News, 7 November 2023, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67330187.

Clapham, Christopher. 1988. Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CSA. 2007. ‘National Population and Housing Census 2007’. Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority.

Faguet, Jean-Paul, Qaiser Khan, and Devarakonda Priyanka Kanth. 2020. ‘Decentralization’s Effects on Education and Health: Evidence from Ethiopia’. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 51 (1): 79–103.

FDRE Constitution. 1995. Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Fiseha, Assefa. 2012. ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years’ Balance Sheet’. Regional & Federal Studies, 22 (4): 435–73. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2012.709502.

Ishiyama, John. 2021. ‘Is Ethnonationalism Growing in Ethiopia and Will It Lead to the Dissolution of the Country? Evidence from the World Value Survey 20072020’. Journal of Asian and African Studies 56 (5): 1024–35.

John, Sonja. 2021. ‘The Potential of Democratization in Ethiopia: The Welkait Question as a Litmus Test’. Journal of Asian and African Studies 56 (5): 1007–23.

Kefale, Asnake. 2013. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia A Comparative Regional Study. New York: Rutledge.

Marcus, Harold G. 1994. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley (Calif.) [etc.: University of California Press.

Mezgebe, Dejen. 2015. ‘Decentralized Governance under Centralized Party Rule in Ethiopia: The Tigray Experience’. Regional & Federal Studies Volume 25 (5): 473–90.

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Tronvoll, Kjetil. 2021. ‘The Sidama Quest for Self-Rule: The Referendum on Regional Statehood Under the Ethiopian Federation’. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 29 (2): 230–51.

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